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Right-wing radicalism has moved to the periphery of public and academic 
attention. This is despite the fact that hate crimes are increasing and right-wing 
populist parties win enough votes to be represented in parliament or even make 
up governments Europe-wide. In addition, the Internet has made it easy for the 
right-wing to network and transport their ideology to a large audience. The 
research, therefore, asks how the German right-wing as a contrast society is 
portrayed on Twitter networks. Because it is the goal of contrast societies to 
change the target society in its favor, the Internet offers a space where an ideal 
society can be created online. Right-wing networks on Twitter will be analyzed 
with a social media analysis using Twitter statistics, NodeXL Pro and Gephi. The 
analysis will be conducted by identifying online radicalization themes, like for 
example hate towards refugees, in the form of hashtags, that constitute the 
alternative reality created online. The results of the analysis will then be 
presented in the context of radical contrast society's efforts to change society. 
This way, it will be possible to come to a meaningful conclusion that includes 
wider societal implications of the right-wings' networking on Twitter.
Research question:
How is the German right-wing as a contrast society portrayed on Twitter 
networks?
Sub-question:
How does the German right-wing operate on Twitter?
While Islamic radicalism and recently the Islamic State's online organizational tactics 
have been in the spotlight of public as well as scholarly debate, the field of right-wing 
radicalism and its online manifestation has moved to the periphery of attention. This is 
despite the fact that in Germany the years 2015 and 2016 saw five times as many right­
wing motivated crimes targeting refugee accommodations as in 2014. The number 
increased from 199 in 2014, to 1.031 in 2015 and dropped slightly to 970 in 2016. 
Criminal assault increased even further and in 2016 there were 2.545 recorded acts of 
violence against refugees and asylum seekers. (Baars and Pinkert, 2017) While there 
was a 12.9 percent decrease in right-wing criminality in 2016 (Schacht, 2018), support 
for right-wing parties has increased across Europe. In the German federal elections 
2017, the conservative Christian Democratic Party and the center Social Democratic 
Party lost 1.5 million voters to the right-wing Alternative for Germany party (Holscher 
and Segger, 2017). Parallel to this, social media has increasingly gained political 
relevance. Boulianne, for example, finds a positive relationship between social media 
use and political participation (Boulianne, 2015) and Kahne and Bowyer identify that 
interest directed activity on social media leads to offline political participation (Kahne 
and Bowyer, 2018). If this is the case, then social media use and abuse by the far-right is 
of political significance, for it draws others towards its ideology, encourages offline 
participation and may ultimately affect public opinion and electoral behavior.
Therefore, an assessment of how the German right-wing operates on Twitter, and how 
its activities there facilitate the creation of a contrast society will add to the growing 
body of research on the right-wing's dynamics, as well as the role of social media in 
creating, maintaining and deepening right-wing networks and their alternative realities.
There is a large gap between the amount of academic literature on right-wing 
radicalization, and its online structures and works on Islamic radicalization respectively. 
In fact, much research is biased towards specific types of organizations and forms of 
political action (political parties, elections, and electoral behavior) without regarding the 
cultural phenomena that surround those parties and often make them successful. This is 
also mirrored in the terminological variety: authors use varying terms like extreme right, 
anti-immigration movements and far-right to describe the same parties like for example 
the French Front National or the German Alternative für Deutschland. (Caiani, 2017) 
However, there is plenty of research on historic and contemporary right-wing radicalism
in Germany because it remains an issue of great public relevance. Yet, benchmark 
research on radicalization processes and pathways mostly concern Islamic radicalization 
(see for example Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Horgan, 2008; Silber and Bhatt, 2007; 
Wiktorowicz, 2004). Of course, general pathways or elements of the process apply to 
both Islamic and right-wing radicalization. However, as right-wing and Islamic radicals 
originate in very different milieus, one cannot rely on Islamic radicalization models to 
explain right-wing radicalization fully. This is not to say there is no academic literature 
on right-wing radicalization -  especially recent works however are not as numerous as 
literature on Islamic radicalization. Klandermans and Mayer identify events in the
radicals' pasts as the most important motivations for their activism, like exposure to
traditional, nationalistic or even authoritarian values during childhood coupled with a 
feeling of stigmatization and loyalty to a (radical) group (Klandermans and Mayer, 
2006). In his study on Scandinavian countries, Bjorgo found that search for identity is 
also a major motivating factor (Bjorgo, 1997).
Regarding the online dimension of right-wing radicalism, Rieger, Frischlich, and Bente, 
for example, examine how psychological uncertainties and authoritarian attitudes shape 
the evaluation of right-wing extremist Internet propaganda. They find, under 
psychological uncertainty, authoritarianism predicted higher persuasiveness and less 
aversion of propaganda videos. In addition, it increased the identification with the 
participants' German nationality. (Rieger, Frischlich, and Bente, 2017) Holt, Freulich, 
Chermark and McCauley assess the use of the Internet by the right-wing and jihadists 
and find that especially videos are powerful in moving individuals to radical action. 
(Holt, Freulich, Chermark and McCauley, 2015) A growing topic of academic research 
is the right-wing‘s use of social media. Khosravinik, for example, assesses how during 
the Brexit campaign, economic grievances have been appropriated in order to project a 
xenophobic discourse from which right-wing parties have capitalized (Khosravinik, 
2017).
To conduct the research, a social network analysis will be conducted. Twitter represents 
an ideal social network for the analysis because it is, as opposed to for example 
Facebook, open and data is therefore easily accessible. The thesis will start with an 
introduction to methodological and theoretical concepts. Eli Pariser's filter bubble will 
serve as an underlying methodological concept. The filter bubble selects content the
user sees by algorithms, based on his or her previous online behavior. Ultimately this 
traps the user in an endless you-loop that magnifies pre-existing believes and hampers 
creativity and the discovery of new concepts that are necessary for personal growth as 
well as an informed political understanding. (Pariser, 2011) To introduce the topic, 
radicalism, as well as radicalization and its online component, are discussed in detail. 
Thereby it is important to note, that there are different pathways that lead to radicalism 
and there is no one-way-fits-all. While radicalization itself is not the main focus of the 
thesis, a nuanced understanding is integral in order to evaluate the importance of the 
findings correctly -  because what may seem as a ‘mere’ right-oriented conservative 
network can in fact be positioned on the pathway to radicalism (discussed for example 
in Sedgwick, 2010; Borum, 2003; Borum, 2011; Litter, 2018; Wiktorowicz, 2004). The 
Internet plays an important role in the radicalization process: individuals can easily be 
trapped in filter bubbles, due to social media algorithms. Social media can therefore 
facilitate radicalization through group dynamics, filter bubbles and the contorted 
presentation of the self online. (Hinds and Joinson, 2017)
Koehler identifies the Internet shapes and even enables radicalization processes and is a 
major driving factor that establishes and fosters the development of radical contrast 
societies. Radical contrast societies are “the habitats of ideologies incompatible with 
their Target Societies' dominant ideologies” (Koehler, 2014 pp. 30, 31) and can be
understood as the mechanisms involved in the radical social movement’s efforts to 
redirect the target society towards the ideologically desired direction. Thereby, the 
Internet is the predominant vehicle to transport ideological concepts and right-wing 
infrastructure (for example music, concerts, demonstrations and merchandise) into the 
target society in order to change individual worldviews. (Koehler, 2014; Koehler, 
2014/15) Social media offers a convenient platform to establish the desired society 
online creating an alternative reality for its members that has the potential to pull them 
further into radicalization due to the filter bubble’s mechanisms.
To select data for the social network analysis, it will be identified how central elements 
of the contrast society’s culture are expressed online in the form of hashtags. The 
subsequent social network analysis will be conducted based on these hashtags. Lastly, 
the results of this analysis can then be reinserted into the contrast society context and 
assessed on a wider societal level.
To conduct the analysis, a combination of social network analysis and Twitter statistics 
will be applied. To establish how the far-right organizes on Twitter, key actors in the 
scene will be identified and their accounts analyzed using twitonomy statistics. 
Twitonomy is a Twitter analysis tool that provides detailed statistics on a user's online 
behavior, like for example interactions with other users, hashtags used and amount of 
tweets per day. The data gained provides the background against which the social 
network analysis is conducted with regard to the contrast society's presence on Twitter. 
In order to assess how the far-right is portrayed as a contrast society, it will be assessed 
how common themes that make up the far-rights' ideology, like racism, are expressed 
on Twitter in the form of hashtags. Thus, popular hashtags are analyzed by importing 
Twitter data through NodeXL Professional and are visualized in Gephi. The results of 
the analysis will demonstrate the extent of the created alternative reality and enclosure 
within the filter bubble. Returning to the contrast society's overall goal to change the 
offline world, it will be possible to come to a meaningful conclusion that includes wider 
societal implications of the right-wings' networking on Twitter.
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1. Introduction
The last couple of years have seen a surge in right-wing populism across Europe. It has 
eroded the center parties' support base that has been stable for centuries and disturbed 
the center-left/center-right duopoly that has governed the continent since the end of 
WWII. While it was initially thought to have originated in the protracted great
recession, the populist challenge stayed -  despite Europe's economic recovery. It has 
now become evident that it feeds on public resistance to cultural liberalization, mass 
immigration and a perceived surrender of national sovereignty to international bodies. 
Especially immigration has become a subject of fiery debates. For many, it raises 
cultural, economic and security fears and weakens the legitimacy of international 
institutions that are considered to be overruling the will of the people in using their 
national political means to protect themselves against threatening developments. This 
anti-internationalist and anti-immigration sentiment that has shifted the European 
political balance may have serious consequences for liberal democracy itself. (Galston, 
2018)
Elections have become crucial tests to the status of Europe's center-left/center-right 
balance. Russia's alleged involvement in the 2016 US presidential campaign has 
brought the potential of Internet ‘trolls' to influence elections to public attention. The 
Russian Internet Research Agency, with close ties to the Kremlin, is reported to have 
hired hundreds of trolls to post false news and socially divisive contents to social media. 
(Masters, 2018) While the social media manipulations of the US elections were (and to 
some extent still are) covered extensively on the news, the involvement of bots and 
trolls in the 2017 German federal elections made all but a few headlines. Prior to the 
elections, German right-wing online activists have created a secretive network to 
coordinate and launch social media campaigns to even the odds for Germany's populist 
right-wing parties. While not as groundbreaking as the campaigns in the United States, 
they succeeded in creating trending hashtags on Facebook and Twitter. Some of their 
campaigns were even adopted by the Russian RT and Sputnik. In addition, some right­
wing activists even received -  some to their own surprise -  support from Russian bots. 
(Gensing and Kampf, 2018)
In addition to the growing support for the populist right and their instrumentalization of 
social media, Steve Bannon, the architect of Donald Trump's very successful election
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campaign and godfather of the American alt-right, has announced the establishment of a 
political foundation in Europe called The Movement, that is to unite the European right. 
In the US election, he stirred social tensions, economic nationalism, incited anger at 
elites and used systematic discrediting of reasoned argumentation as well as the spread 
of false news to achieve victory. In Europe, his first target is set to be the European 
parliamentary elections in 2019, whose turnout has constantly declined. In fact, voters 
have used the EU parliamentary elections to express discontent about their national 
conditions and protest parties have been the beneficiaries. (Steve Bannon's plot, 2018)
Due to these alarming developments, a thorough understanding of how the right-wing 
operates on social media is crucial, in order to meet these (new) challenges effectively. 
Therefore, this research seeks to illuminate the German right-wing's operations on 
Twitter. Specifically, it asks how the German right-wing as a contrast society is 
portrayed on Twitter networks.
There is a large gap between the amount of academic literature on right-wing
radicalization and its online structures and Islamic radicalization respectively. This is
not to say there is no academic literature on right-wing radicalization -  especially recent 
works, however, are not as numerous as literature on its Islamic counterpart. (Caiani, 
2017) In fact, benchmark research on these processes and pathways mostly concerns the 
latter (see for example Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Horgan, 2008; Silber and Bhatt, 2007; 
Wiktorowicz, 2004). In addition, much research is biased towards specific types of 
organizations and forms of political action (political parties, elections, and electoral 
behavior) without regarding the cultural phenomena that surround those parties and 
often make them successful. (Caiani, 2017)
Research on the right-wing's online activities is a dynamic and growing field. Rieger, 
Frischlich, and Bente, for example, examine how psychological uncertainties and 
authoritarian attitudes shape the evaluation of right-wing extremist Internet propaganda. 
They find, under psychological uncertainty, authoritarianism predicts higher 
persuasiveness and less aversion of propaganda videos. In addition, it increases the 
identification with the participants' German nationality. (Rieger, Frischlich, and Bente, 
2017) Holt, Freulich, Chermark, and McCauley assess the use of the Internet by the 
right-wing and jihadists and find that especially videos are powerful in moving 
individuals to radical action. (Holt, Freulich, Chermark and McCauley, 2015) The right-
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wing‘s use of social media is, therefore, a growing topic of academic research. 
Khosravinik, for example, assesses how during the Brexit campaign, economic 
grievances have been appropriated in order to project a xenophobic discourse from 
which right-wing parties have capitalized (Khosravinik, 2017). There is, therefore, a 
growing body of research on the right's online activities and a thorough analysis of the 
German right-wing's activities on Twitter will add valuable insights to this field.
In this research, it will be argued that the German right-wing creates an alternative 
reality as a contrast society on Twitter, in which it acts out elements of its ideology. 
Therefore, relevant actors of the German right-wing scene will be introduced first, in 
order to gain an overview of members in the offline world, which will be subject to 
assessment in a social network analysis. In addition, also the right-wing ideology will be 
discussed, so that ideological elements can be identified and classified during the 
analysis. Furthermore, the German online landscape is mapped in order to put the 
analysis of Twitter networks into the wider online context. This will include the political 
relevance of social media activity, in order to emphasize its relevance as well as media 
use in Germany in general and a brief introduction to German right-wing use of the 
Internet -  again to put the subsequent analysis into its wider context.
The actors identified will be analyzed in a social network analysis so as to establish how 
the German right-wing operates on Twitter. This will, on the one hand, serves to 
demonstrate that the right-wing conversation on Twitter largely takes place within a 
filter bubble, and on the other, to identify online structures and networks beyond these 
groups' offline organizations. In addition, these groups' approaches to persuade 
potential supporters, solidify existing views and justify their position will be assessed. 
This step will furthermore determine radicalizing themes in the form of hashtags that 
these actors use, like for example #NoIslam. These themes should be used by a large 
segment of the German right-wing online population and create a discourse that portrays 
their reality in a very different light. It will be argued that they, in fact, portray an 
alternative reality on Twitter that diverges from the real-world offline reality, and thus 
construct a contrast society, as defined by Daniel Koehler. Therefore, it will be assessed 
how the German right-wing as a contrast society is portrayed on Twitter networks. To 
answer this question, the before identified radicalizing themes will be analyzed by 
extracting quantitative data from Twitter and performing a social network analysis.
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Together with the previous step, this shall demonstrate how the contrast society is 
constructed on Twitter networks. Lastly, the results of the analysis will be put into the 
broader societal context, so that a general conclusion of the right-wing's online 
activities for society as well as politics can be made.
This introduction is therefore followed by a methodology chapter, which introduces the 
research question, as well as Eli Pariser's filter bubble as an important underlying 
concept. It also includes an introduction to social network analysis, in which the means 
of analysis and the data used are introduced. Chapter 3 on right-wing radicalism 
examines theoretical approaches to radicalism as well as radicalization. Thereby it needs 
to be noted that radicalism is an ambiguous term that lacks a clear definition. With 
regards to radicalization, academia currently identifies various different pathways into 
it; therefore an overview of the different pathways and elements is offered in sub­
chapter 3.1. This is followed by a more elaborate discussion of online radicalization. 
While approaches to radicalization, in general, include online elements to some extent, a 
more nuanced understanding of online radicalization is necessary, due to the approach 
chosen in this research. Chapter 3 finishes with a section on Daniel Koehler's take on 
radical social movements as contrast societies. This concept serves as the underlying 
framework against which the analysis will be conducted.
The analysis in chapter 4 begins with an introduction to German right-wing actors and 
their ideology, followed by an outline of the German online landscape in sub-chapter 
4.2. Thereby the political relevance of social media activity is discussed first, followed 
by an overview of media use in Germany and an introduction to the German right­
wing's use of social media. In sub-chapter 4.3 the German right-wing on Twitter, the 
actors previously identified will be analyzed with various Twitter analysis tools in order 
to assess how the German right-wing operates on Twitter and which radicalizing themes 
re-occur. The latter will be analyzed in sub-chapter 4.4, right-wing Twitter networks as 
a contrast society. Together these last two sub-chapters will provide the answer to the 
research question “How is the German right-wing as a contrast society portrayed on 
Twitter networks?”, that will be discussed and evaluated in the conclusion.
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2. Methodology
The introduction has demonstrated that the right-wing is evolving and society and 
politics need to catch up with it. To arrive at a more thorough understanding of these 
issues, the German radical right is conceptualized as a contrast society in order to put its 
actions into the wider societal context. Therefore the research question is:
How is the German right-wing as a contrast society portrayed on Twitter 
networks?
In a first step, the concept of radicalism, as well as radicalization, are introduced and 
discussed. This is important to have a concise comprehension of what contributes 
radical behavior and which processes foster radicalization. The latter is specifically 
important as knowledge of the dynamics of the radicalization processes can help to 
comprehend why groups and parties that are on the verge of being radical are still 
dangerous. After these concepts are clarified, Koehler's approach to radical social 
movements as contrast societies is discussed. Conceptualizing the German right-wing as 
a contrast society adds depth to the analysis and structures the assessment of its Twitter 
networks. In order to accomplish the latter, a sub-question has been developed that will 
aid and direct the analysis:
How does the German right-wing operate on Twitter?
Therefore, to answer the sub-question, the German far-right actors and their ideology 
are introduced. This overview is important to, on the one hand, identify which parties 
and groups to include in the analysis, and on the other, to identify themes, in the form of 
hashtags, that will be used to assess how the radical right as a contrast society is 
depicted on Twitter. It is the goal of contrast societies to change the target society in its 
favor and the Internet offers a space where an ideal society can be created online. 
Twitter has been chosen as the subject of analysis because it is open and data can be 
easily attained. For the right-wing, it is also a convenient platform to communicate and 
share ideas. Conceptualizing the right-wing online as a contrast society serves a double 
function: it puts the alternative reality lived by the right-wing into a societal context and 
provides a framework on how to assess its interactions and connection to the wider 
online population. Especially with the use of hashtags, a larger conversation is
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established that solidifies existing beliefs and ideology but also reaches the broader 
Twitter community and potentially takes influence there. Therefore, the sub-question 
will aid in identifying radicalizing themes (like for example #noIslam), that are pillars in 
the contrast society's alternative reality created online. These themes are to be analyzed 
with a social network analysis and the results will provide a picture of the German right­
wing's motifs, strategies, and networks on Twitter. Using the contrast society concept, 
this overview is then put into the broader societal context to arrive at a meaningful 
conclusion.
Before the overview of theoretical concepts in chapter 3, this chapter discusses the filter 
bubble as a methodological concept that forms the basis of the research, as well as the 
research methods used in the analysis.
2.1 Filter Bubble
The filter bubble is an important methodological part of this paper because it has a great 
effect on social media users' online activities. A thorough understanding is required 
prior to the commencement of the research.
The news we consume, our job opportunities, shopping bargains, loans, and insurances 
are increasingly tailored to our preferences; predetermined by algorithms based on 
clicks and likes. While it is convenient, increasing personalization eventually leads to 
informational determinism whereby what one has clicked in the past determines what 
one sees next. It is an ‘endless you-loop', in which ideas and beliefs are continually 
reinforced, without challenge, whereby one can get stuck in an ever-narrowing version 
of oneself. “Democracy requires a reliance on shared facts; instead we're being offered 
parallel but separate universes” (Pariser, 2011 p. 8). In his book “The Filter Bubble: 
What the Internet is Hiding from You”, Eli Pariser calls this dynamic ‘filter bubble': 
content is selected by algorithms based on users' previous behavior (Bakshy, Messing, 
Adamic, 2015), as visualized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Filter bubble visualized (Pariser, 2015)
The filter bubble functions like a lens and controls what we see and do not see on the 
Web. One the one hand it can serve as a magnifying glass by increasing knowledge in a 
niche area, but on the other, it limits what we are exposed to and therefore affects how 
we think and learn. The latter thereby strengthens existing ideas and removes contents 
from the environment that inspire to learn. As proven in numerous psychological 
studies, the knowledge that something is hidden inspires curiosity. However, because 
the filter bubble hides invisibly, we are not compelled to learn more about what we do 
not know. Moreover, a filtered world can upset the mental balance between open- 
mindedness and focus -  a balance that creates creativity.
Today, our Google or Facebook identities color everything else the Internet shows us.
This is a stark departure from the appeal of the World Wide Web's early days: it was
sought to be a revolutionary tool, a great equalizer that granted children in the streets of 
an impoverished country the same access to information as businessmen in New York 
City. But instead of equalizing, personalization separates us into different categories. 
Most personalized filters work in a three-step model: first, they establish who people are 
and what they like, then they provide content that may be of interest. Lastly, the person 
fine tunes these contents to get the fit right. The underlying logic behind this is that 
one's identity shapes one's media. Pariser, however, argues that this logic is flawed and 
media also shapes identity. “As a result, these services may end up creating a good fit 
between you and your media by changing ... you”. [...] we 're now on the verge o f self­
fulfilling identities, in which the Internet's distorted picture o f us becomes who we 
really are.” (Pariser, 2011 p. 63) Thus, while students at Ivy League colleges see 
targeted job advertisements, students at state schools may never be aware of these
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opportunities. This example signifies the great impact the filter bubble can have on our 
decisions and ultimately, on who we become.
A click on a link signals interest in a topic -  and one will be more likely to see articles 
about it in the future. Research has shown, that when repeatedly confronted with a 
statement, people tend to believe it is true. The same applies to an article that has been 
clicked: this topic will come up in the news feed in the future, increasing the chances to 
become convinced of its statements. Pariser argues that if the personalized filters have 
misrepresented somebody's identity, then what the algorithm thinks is that person, 
becomes amplified and may ultimately shape him or her.
In the scientific world, to test a hypothesis, one always looks to prove it wrong -  by 
finding the outlier. Thus if Netflix knows somebody loves romantic comedy, it should 
suggest that person to watch Transformers to prove itself wrong. Yet this does not 
happen because the filter bubble writes-off outliers, despite that fact that it is the latter, 
that are known to inspire creativity and change.
The Internet was also hoped to decentralize power, but because the filter bubble is 
controlled by just some central companies like for example Facebook and Google, 
power is concentrated instead. This also applies to the political process: targeted voter 
ads, for example, will inform potential voters only about campaign contents that interest 
them and leave out all the rest. Issues of public concern, like homelessness, are lost to 
citizens because of the filter bubble's dynamic and fail to reach them through public 
election campaigns. Pariser concludes therefore that while the Internet offers an 
incredible amount of options, we miss many of them through the filter bubble: “while 
the Internet can give us new opportunities to grow and experiment with our identities, 
the economics of personalization push toward a static conception of statehood. While 
the Internet has the potential to decentralize knowledge and control, in practice it's
concentrating control over what we see and what opportunities we're offered in the
hands o f fewer people than ever before. [...] But what's troubling about this shift to 
personalization is that it's largely invisible to users and, as a result, out o f control. [...] 
The Internet may know who we are, but we don't know who it thinks we are or how it's 
using that information.” (Pariser, 2011 p. 119) The Internet has great capacity, yet it 
does not address core problems. Instead, there is a distraction overlay, focusing our 
attention away from issues like homelessness and climate change. (Pariser, 2011)
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While the filter bubble signifies an online ‘space', the echo chamber is a concept that
precedes the filter bubble and can refer to a situation both online and offline. Mostly,
however, the two are used interchangeably in research and media -  or one is mentioned 
and the other neglected. Many attribute Sunstein as the ‘founder' of the echo chamber 
and his original 2002 volume “Republic.com” as well as its two revisions from 2007, 
“Republic.com 2.0” and 2017 “#Republic” are often cited in other scholarly work on 
echo chambers and filter bubbles. Yet, seeking a clear differentiation between Pariser's
filter bubble and Sunstein's echo chamber, one finds that Sunstein conceptualized the
echo chamber as a literary term (Sunsetin, 2002, 2007, 2017), whereas the filter bubble 
is a concise theoretical concept. Therefore, the filter bubble concept is used in this 
research.
Pariser's filter bubble powerfully demonstrates the real-world implications that online 
algorithms can have: they not only have the capacity to change the user but can also 
remove important societal issues from his or her perception, despite the fact that 
uncomfortable truths need to be told for citizens to make informed political choices.
2.2. Research Method
In order to establish how the right-wing is depicted as a contrast society on social 
media, a social network analysis (SNA) will be conducted. Twitter has been chosen as 
the network of analysis due to its open nature. It is therefore much easier to get access to 
data than on more private platforms, like for example Facebook. SNA is an 
interdisciplinary research field that aspires to ascertain the relationships between social 
entities and draws inferences about the network as a whole, or those belonging to it 
individually or in clusters. Much of SNA is borrowed from graph theory, a field in the 
mathematics that is concerned with discrete relational structures. A social network is 
made up of entities and the relations between them -  this way social relationships can 
be visualized in a graph. The visualization is made up of nodes (here Twitter accounts) 
that are connected to other nodes via edges (their social relationships). The location of 
nodes is subjective because it is defined by aesthetic or communicative criteria. This is 
due to the fact that social networks are defined by the patterns of edges among the 
nodes, which is not affected by the different placement of nodes within the display.
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Thus, there are different visualization algorithms that can be chosen to visualize the 
data. Most layout algorithms have a common aim to place nodes close to their network 
neighbors, prevent nodes from overlapping, minimize the number of edge crossing and 
retain approximate edge length. The size and shape of nodes can be customized 
according to different individual attributes or structural properties. The width of edges 
can be used to indicate the connection's strength and color can be used to distinguish 
between distinct nodes or edges. (Butts, 2008 and Knoke and Yang, 2008)
This research combines SNA and Twitter statistics to analyze the data. To establish how 
the far-right organizes on Twitter key actors in the scene will be identified and their 
accounts analyzed using twitonomy statistics. Twitonomy is a Twitter analysis tool that 
provides detailed statistics on a user's online behavior, like for example interactions 
with other users, hashtags used and number of tweets per day. The data gained provides 
the background against which the SNA is conducted with regard to the far-right's 
organization on Twitter. In order to assess how the right-wing is portrayed as a contrast 
society, it will be assessed how common themes that make up its ideology, like racism, 
are expressed on Twitter in the form of hashtags. Thus, popular hashtags are analyzed 
by importing Twitter data through NodeXL Professional and are visualized in Gephi. To 
provide more depth, this part also includes Keyhole hashtag analysis. Keyhole is a tool 
that provides a detailed output on hashtags, like for example how many users a hashtag 
has reached, how many use it and how many interacted with, as well as hashtags 
frequently used together with it.
To visualize the data, the ForceAtlas2 algorithm is chosen. ForceAtlas2 is an algorithm 
in Gephi, developed by Mathieu Jacomy, a founding member of Gephi, at the Sciences
Po Medialab in Paris. It is scaled for small- to medium-sized graphs (10 to 10.000 
nodes) and therefore ideal for the data used in this research. Like the more well-known 
Fruchterman Rheingold algorithm, it is continuous, meaning it is a strong algorithm that 
can be manipulated while it is rendering. It is a linear model -  so all nodes in the 
graphic have a linear correlation and it features a Barnes Hut optimization. (Jacomy, 
2011) The latter is a non-linear approximation algorithm and allows for the visualization 
of clusters of nodes that can be grouped based on their connections. Therefore, it will be 
possible to visualize filter bubbles in the social network analysis.
Besides the visual representation of social networks, Gephi also provides a variety of 
analytical measures to deepen the network analysis. The most insightful measure for the
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purpose of this research is the modularity measure. It detects and characterizes 
community structures in a network and thus uncovers densely connected groups of 
nodes that have only sparse connections between groups. This means that the 
modularity measure can detect filter bubbles in the sense that it uncovers whether 
Twitter users communicate within small groups and whether those groups are 
interconnected or just sparsely so. The modularity measure ranks from 0 to 1. A high 
modularity measure signifies there are dense connections between the nodes in a 
module, but sparse connections between nodes in different clusters. (Newman, 2006) 
For the analysis of the graph, the nodes will be also colored by modularity, in order for 
the clusters to be clearly distinguishable. In addition, the nodes' size is also ranked by 
modularity. Thus, in clusters with great density of connections between the nodes, the 
central nodes are bigger, than in clusters with lower density. Together, the application of 
ForceAtlas2, as well as the modularity measure and node appearance, will create graphs 
that provide meaningful information about the network and its sub-groups. The 
observations gained through the SNA will determine how the far-right is organized on 
Twitter and how it is portrayed as a contrast society.
While there is a reasonably large amount of German right-wing Twitter users, this 
research only discusses the networks surrounding popular parties and movements. This 
provides the acquisition of data with a structure but also limits the research. However, a 
broader focus would exceed the limits of this research and is therefore not viable.
To establish a thorough comprehension of what radicalism and radicalization constitute 
and imply, the following chapter elaborates on these concepts in detail.
3. Right-wing Extremism
In order to correctly evaluate right-wing radicalism online, it is paramount to approach 
the topic with a sufficient comprehension of radicalism on the one hand, and 
radicalization processes on the other. While the latter is not the primary focus of this 
research, knowledge of the dynamics that facilitate radicalization can add depth to the 
assessment of the German right-wing online. This chapter, therefore, begins with a 
general introduction to radicalism, followed by an elaboration on radicalization. Both 
include online as well as offline components, but because this research focuses on
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online activities, chapter 3.2 illustrates online radicalization in detail. This is followed 
by an introduction to Koehler's approach on radical social movements as contrast 
societies, which provides the underlying framework against which the German right­
wing online will be assessed.
3.1 Radicalism and radicalization
The concept ‘radical' in itself is uncontroversial. It is synonymous for extremist and 
opposed to moderate and thus indicates a relative position on a continuum. But where 
does the moderate end of the continuum lie, and where to draw the line? And what type
of continuum should be used -  not all groups are single-issue. There are numerous 
approaches to define radicalism -  which will be discussed in the following.
Radicalism
A classic philosophical approach as outlined by José Ortega y Gasset, a Spanish 
political philosopher, states that radicalism constitutes the desire to correct the uses of 
something, e.g. power, rather than the abuses of it. Following this approach however, 90 
percent of the Arab population would be classified as radical. Egon Bittner, an 
American sociologist defines radicalism as “”a unified and internally consistent 
interpretation of the world” which becomes an inflexible guide to action” (as cited in 
Sedgwick, 2010 p. 482). This interpretation too, however, risks classifying any devout 
religious follower as a radical. Analytic definitions are rare; most researchers assume 
that the absolute meaning of radical is understood, or rely on its relative meaning. Some 
draw a distinction between activism and radicalism; activism is understood as 
“readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action” (as cited in Sedgwick,
2010 p. 483), whereas radicalism is shaped by a “readiness to engage in illegal and 
violent political action” (as cited in Sedgwick, 2010 p. 483). Both definitions regard 
radicalism not as a state of mind as the philosophical interpretations do, but as a 
tendency towards a certain range of action (Sedgwick, 2010).
Randy Borum suggests an approach that defines radicalism as a political ideology that 
opposes a society's core values and principles. In liberal democracies, this would be any 
ideology that promotes religious or racial supremacy and/ or opposes the core values of 
democracy and human rights. Radicalism also includes the measures through which
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actors try to achieve their goals that demonstrate a disregard for life, liberty and human 
rights of others (Borum, 2011).
Official definitions vary greatly too and illustrate the different approaches countries take 
to radicalism. In his article, Sedgwick compares the definitions of the US, Canada, the 
UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark, which represent a range of official thinking. All 
agree that a radical and a terrorist are different: the terrorist is also a radical, but the 
radical is not necessarily a terrorist. All also define the radical with reference to the 
extremist and most definitions include a reference to the radical as a threat. None of the 
three add much analytical depth, however. The first is important, yet uncontroversial, 
the second follows the relative definition and does not add more precision and the third 
is a circular argument: radicalism that is a threat is threatening radicalism. Therefore 
one must look at the points of divergence in the official definitions. The relationship 
between radicalism and violence is such a divergence. While something that leads to 
violence is certainly a threat, can something that does not directly lead to violence or 
something that does not lead to violence at all be still classified a threat? Another 
divergence is the relationship between thought and action: while some official 
definitions of threat-radicalism refer to ideology of belief, others do not. (Sedgwick, 
2010)
Adding to the confusion around the definition of radicalism are the different contexts 
within which the term is used and the ensuing competition between different agendas. 
Sedgwick identifies two official and semi-official agendas which are of relevance to 
right-wing radicalism: the security and integration agenda. Because, like most 
radicalization literature, Sedgwick focuses on Islamism, relevant aspects concerning 
right-wing radicalism are added here. The security agenda focuses on how radicalism 
may pose a direct or indirect threat to the state or its citizens. Apart from the direct 
threat of terrorism, indirect threats are manifold, like the distribution of propaganda. 
These, however, are subject of dispute as it is very difficult to draw the line between for 
example free speech and sedition. Because terrorist groups can be placed into a broader 
social, political or ethnic movement (both violent and non-violent) such groups may 
also be on the security agenda. This may lead to an increased feeling of oppression and 
feed into the radicals' narrative. For the integration agenda, Sedgwick argues that 
desegregation and the avoidance of segregation are important elements to prevent 
radicalism. Good integration is vital to counter the neo-nationalist agenda. While the
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latter is not always represented in national governments, established parties take their 
positions into consideration to appeal to potential voters and keep such parties out of 
parliament. With regard to right-wing extremists, the German government promotes 
intercultural dialogue and strong counter-narratives. Both agendas can conflict with one 
another sometimes, for example, if a right-wing party argues against immigrants, it
would be considered radical in terms of the integration agenda, but not so for the
security agenda. Such a group might actually be useful as a source of information -  here 
the two agendas conflict. Also, security-wise it may be sensible to support a group that 
is not a security threat (but one to the integration agenda) to provide an alternative to a 
group that is a security threat. Also, Islamic home-grown terrorists are or seem to be, 
often well-integrated into society and evade the integration agenda's attention. 
(Sedgwick, 2010)
Radicalization
Now that the term radicalism has been explained, the same will be attempted for 
radicalization. Just like radicalism, the latter is very difficult to define, for there is not 
one single pathway that causes an individual to radicalize and approaches to explain the 
phenomenon are plentiful. In fact, it is “one of the most opaque and difficult research
areas in the study of contemporary extremism” (Litter, 2018 p. 95), as reliable data is
very difficult to access, causation hard to establish and no valid measurement tools can 
be created. And because a universal ‘terrorist-profile' has not been found -  despite great 
efforts -  the quest to develop a grand theory of radicalization appears to be doomed to 
fail (Litter, 2018). Nonetheless, the stories of terrorist's pathways into radicalization 
have enabled research to identify possible pathways into violent radicalization that 
provide valuable insights. While the radicalization process of right-wing radicals in 
Germany is not the main focus of this paper, approaches to radicalization pathways still 
illuminate the dynamics of radicalism online and the individuals and groups analyzed 
later are situated on the here introduced pathways. Thus, a clear understanding of the 
radicalization processes and dynamics will add significant insight into individual and 
group dynamics, the significance of findings and threats of further radicalization. It also 
needs to be noted, that while the last decade has seen a shift in social communication
that increasingly blurs online and offline engagement, ‘online radicalization' is not a 
specific or separate phenomenon, but a part of radicalization in general. (Litter, 2018)
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The structural elements that make individuals susceptible to radicalization are similar 
for most forms of extremism, with only the triggers and narrative frames differing 
between extremist groups. Little academic theory focuses exclusively on the radical 
right, but mostly on Islamism. Generally, the literature differentiates between three 
theoretical strands, individual trait theories, ideological theories and rational choice 
theories. According to individual trait theories, an individual radicalizes based on his or 
her personality and characteristics shaped by biology, social experiences and 
psychological traits. This approach deterministically considers concerned individuals to 
be inescapably moving towards violent radicalization. However, there is little academic 
evidence to support this approach -  individual traits may, however, be necessary 
prerequisites to the radicalization process. Ideological theories identify ideological 
requirements of a group or cause to be driving individuals towards extreme action. This 
approach is often used to explain religious violence, yet given the millions of religious 
followers and the low prevalence of terrorism, violent radicals must rely on extremely 
selective interpretations of guiding texts. In this regard, the Internet plays an important 
facilitating role, as it significantly lowers the barriers to publication, access, and 
proliferation of such texts. Lastly, rational choice theories regard violent extremism as a 
consciously chosen strategy of desperate political actors. Such theories seek to identify 
factors that shape perceptiveness towards radical ideologies and calls to action. (Litter, 
2018) Within rational choice literature, scholars differentiate between linear and non­
linear radicalization processes. In a linear process, the individual has to pass through 
several radicalization stages, to reach the final radicalized stage, whereas in a non-linear 
process, there is no fixed order and the different elements can rather be described as 
pieces of a puzzle.
Borum suggests a four-stage linear psychological model according to which an 
individual develops an ideology that justifies terrorism. In the initial stage the individual 
questions the current status and judges it to be undesirable; ‘it's not right'. During the 
second stage, ‘it's not fair', the individual compares his or her status to others and 
concludes it is unjust and the inequality is illegitimate. If a specific other group is 
blamed for the illegitimate condition of one's own group then the third stage is reached 
-  ‘it's your fault'. In the final stage this out-group is dehumanized and vilified, negative 
stereotypes are generated and violence becomes legitimized because it is directed 
against an evil group responsible for all perceived discrimination. (Borum, 2003)
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Quintain Wiktorowicz identifies four linear processes that lead a person to join an 
Islamic extremist group: cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and 
socialization. The cognitive opening usually is induced by a personal crisis through 
which an individual is more perceptive to ideas that were likely to be rejected before the 
crisis. The latter could be the loss of a job, experience with discrimination or the loss of 
a significant other. During the religious seeking stage, the persons' perceptiveness is 
directed towards religion. This religious seeking can bring the individual to consider 
radical worldviews. (Wiktorowicz, 2004) Applied to right-wing radicalism, a person 
may seek a system of thought to help explain a confusing and intimidating situation. 
Wiktorowicz further argues that through discussion and exploration of the Islamist 
worldview the individual reaches the frame alignment stage, where he or she considers 
their worldview as coinciding with the radical one -  the same of course applies to right­
wing radicalization. In the final socializing and joining stage the individual joins the 
group and adopts the group identity. To maintain ideology and identity, the individual 
keeps in close contact with other group members and retreats from mainstream society 
at the same time. This socialization stage can also take place online. (Wiktorowicz, 
2004)
Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins develop a non-linear approach to explain the 
pathways that lead to radicalization, using a puzzle analogy. The pieces of the 
radicalization puzzle are grievances, networks, ideologies, enabling environments and 
support structures. The authors further distinguish between radicalization and violent 
extremism or terrorism. Whereas radicalization entails a cognitive dimension, violent 
extremism involves a behavioral dimension that can escalate from mere legal activism 
to participation in terrorism. In the following, the pieces of the radicalization puzzle will 
be introduced. Thereby the pieces are adapted to right-wing radicalization, instead of the 
authors' focus, Islamic radicalization. Grievances can be political or economic in nature. 
(Hafez, Mullins, 2015) For the Greek Golden Dawn movement, economic concerns 
played a major role, whereas German Pegida adherents identified their anxiety over 
migrant criminality as a common trait and key issue (Litter, 2018). Networks can be 
preexisting friendship or kinship ties, where trust and commitment are already 
established, that introduce the individual to radical views. However, this can also 
happen among strangers in online spaces (Hafez, Mullins, 2015). As Koehler points out, 
chat rooms are often monitored and potential recruits are lured into private discussions
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(Koehler, 2014/2015). Often the group leader encourages a deeper commitment and 
bridge burning, leading to a spiral of encapsulation in which links to the external non­
radical world are cut-off and defection from the group becomes increasingly costly. 
Ideology comprises a set of beliefs about the world. Usually, political radical 
movements identify a social condition as the problem, attribute a root cause to it and 
suggest a course of action to solve the issue. For violent action to be accepted among 
the group, it is necessary to dehumanize the enemy. Lastly, enabling environment and 
support structures facilitate radicalization. Today, the Internet and diverse media 
environment serve this role. Recruiters use the Internet to avoid legal and physical limits 
and social media can create a sense of belonging and membership in a group or cause.
Besides approaches on radicalization more general, there are also specific ones on the 
dynamics of online radicalization, which will be discussed in the following.
3.2 Online radicalization
Hinds and Joinson, agree with Eli Pariser, that not only do we shape technology, but it
also shapes us -  through the decisions made by its designers and through the contents it 
provides. Therefore the Internet can neither be considered to deterministically cause 
radicalization nor to be a socially neutral tool. Instead, the Internet provides affordances 
-  objects that afford certain types of behavior. Group behavior, filter bubbles, and self­
presentation online can all afford a certain type of behavior or transformation that is 
conducive to the radicalization process. As pointed out above, groups can change 
behavior due to the fact that individuals feel less accountable for their actions; attitudes 
can become more extreme due to group polarization, groupthink and an increased 
inclination to conform. These together may increase the potential for online 
radicalization. Filter bubbles are related to group polarization: the Internet can fuel filter 
bubbles and certain opinions become re-circulated and reinforced which can lead to a 
change in mindset. Moreover, social media services also provide validation of content 
through other users' positive reactions and sharing -  even false information can gain 
credence if it is shared and supported enough. Radicalization theories all point to 
grievances and the authors argue that the Internet can facilitate an increased amount of 
materials that fuel such grievances. Therefore, if a large enough group of people share 
and support radical content, it is likely that individuals exposed to it adopt such views.
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Further, online affirmation can help to confirm identities that are stigmatized in public. 
Therefore, the combination of in-group homogeneity, filter bubbles, expression of ideas 
and identities that are usually hidden from the public as well as confirmation and 
support from others can encourage increased radicalization. Lastly, communication via 
computers can have an effect on how individuals interact and present themselves online. 
Recruiters may pose as someone whose identity is more appealing to their subject; 
private conversations can be used to create intimacy and are very persuasive as outside 
intervention is impossible. In addition, awareness of an audience (for example Twitter 
followers or a private group chat) can cause individuals to present themselves more 
favorably towards this group. Some research suggests that because individuals spend so 
much time presenting themselves online, they may alter their offline identity as a result 
of it. Thus, the combination of interactions with similarly minded others and selective 
self-presentation over time can lead to increased levels of intimacy and make an 
individual feel more committed to their online identity. Feedback to this identity via 
likes, comments and tweets can deepen this commitment. Social media, therefore, 
affords radicalization through group dynamics, filter bubbles and the (deceitful) 
presentation of the self online. (Hinds and Joinson, 2017)
Stevens and Neumann also agree that the Internet is not the principal driver of the 
radicalization process, but plays a role in it. While it has a virtual dimension, it is rooted 
in the real world. They argue that political extremists and those in the process of 
radicalization use the Internet for the same reasons as the broad majority of the online 
public. The Internet reduces the cost of communication to the extent that exchange and 
dissemination of information is free, provides unlimited access to much of the world's 
knowledge, it is easy to find people and form networks with like-minded individuals 
despite great geographic distances and has lowered the threshold to engage in risky or 
embarrassing behavior significantly because it helps to conceal the users' identity. Thus 
these opportunities that the Web offers can be beneficial to extremist causes. Three of 
the former are especially problematic in the context of radicalization: the Internet can be 
used to reinforce ideological messages -  which become particularly problematic when 
the dynamics of the filter bubble come into play -  and potential supporters have 
immediate access to contents that powerfully seek to substantiate extreme political 
claims. It is also very easy to join groups and integrate into more formal organizations. 
Furthermore, it is also comparably risk-free to seek like-minded individuals and form a
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network with them. Lastly, all these together create an environment which normalizes 
otherwise unacceptable views and behaviors. The authors conclude that the Internet, 
therefore, can intensify and accelerate radicalization. However, face-to-face interaction 
remains pivotal because online communication cannot replace ties of friendship and 
kinship that form intense personal loyalties. (Stevens and Neumann, 2009) While this
conclusion is relevant for counter-terrorism and counter-violent-extremism efforts, the
offline connections between radicals are not subject of this paper -  although they 
represent an important piece of the overall radicalization picture.
In his contribution to the CTC Sentinel, Berger analyzes ISIS' online recruiting 
behavior and discoveres a common four-step approach that is applied by recruiters or 
supporters to radicalize targets: first contact, create micro-community, shift to private 
conversation, identify and encourage pro-Islamic State action suitable for the target. In 
the first contact stage recruiters sift through online communities that can be both radical 
and mainstream, to find receptive individuals. Islamic State recruiters and supporters 
also establish communication with potentially disenfranchised people to address and 
confirm their grievances -  which can have a radicalizing effect, as pointed out by Hinds 
and Joinson. When the first contact is established a micro-community is created around 
the target. Thereby, the recruiter creates a large number of posts in order for the recruit 
to find conversation at any time. After a certain time, the recruiter tries to discourage the 
target to trust other Muslims with mainstream beliefs. Once a relationship starts to 
develop, some communication is moved to private spaces where the actual recruitment 
work begins. However, Berger too argues that offline physical outreach has not been 
abolished and still takes place as well. When the target has been sufficiently turned, the 
recruiter will try to identify the most likely action the target is willing to undertake and 
encourage implementation. (Berger, 2015)
While Berger's approach refers to Islamic State recruiting, the pattern he describes is 
commonly described in offline radicalization processes too: an individual is targeted or 
seeks guidance, a small group forms and increasingly isolates and decides on a course 
of action to support the cause. With or without targeted recruiting, it is not farfetched to 
assume that this process may as well happen online in the right-wing radical milieu: 
individuals discover social media networks that confirm their grievances and support 
their opinions. They slowly become trapped in a filter bubble and establish a network of 
like-minded users. In order to talk more privately or to avoid the deletion of their
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accounts, they move to private spaces that further isolate them from competing 
opinions. There they may develop strategies for online as well as offline activism.
In his study on online radicalization centered on interviews with former German right­
wing extremists, Koehler finds that the interviewees' radicalization process was shaped 
or even enabled through the Internet. In his study, he seeks to find out how the Internet 
and elements connected to it influence individual radicalization processes. Thereby he 
conceptualizes radicalization as the pluralization of political concepts according to a 
specific ideology. He argues that the best concept to depict how the Internet influences 
the radicalization process is the ‘contrast society'. (Koehler, 2014/15)
Contrast societies serve as the guiding principle in this research because they allow for 
the illustration of right-wing networks within wider society and their interactions with 
it. Therefore, the next section elaborates on Koehler's contrast societies in detail.
3.3 The German right as a contrast society
Koehler developed an approach that addresses radical social movements' embedment 
into the larger society, which he calls contrast society. This concept synergizes Social 
Movement Theory and Counterculture Theory and highlights the dynamics of 
interaction between a radical group and its surrounding society. (Koehler, 2014) 
Thereby, the Internet is a driving force in establishing and fostering the development of 
radical contrast societies (Koehler, 2014/15). This concept is therefore ideal for the 
purpose of this research, as it synergizes the dynamics of the Internet and its enabling 
structures as well as the filter bubble and radicalization processes.
Koehler defines contrast societies as follows:
“Contrast Societies can be understood as the mechanisms involved within the 
social system (including infrastructure and ideology) of interaction between 
Radical Social Movements and their surrounding societies. This mechanism 
starts with the Radical Social Movement's goal to redirect the Target Society 
towards the (ideologically) desired direction and change it into the ideologically 
purified version of the Target Society. This includes the alternative societal 
environments created as well as the ideological niches within the positive Target 
Society already influenced. Thus, these Contrast Societies are the habitats of
22
ideologies incompatible with their Target Societies' dominant ideologies” 
(Koehler, 2014 pp. 30, 31)
Contrast societies rely on a dynamic exchange between the radical movement and its 
surrounding environment through ideology and infrastructure in order to create an 
ideologically purified society. Therefore, ideological concepts have to be transported 
into individual worldviews. The Internet thereby serves as the main facilitator as it 
combines the ideological pillar with the infrastructure of the radical social movement. 
This way, newcomers to the movement learn the ideology, language, topics, and 
behavior first online, before they engage in offline activities. (Koehler, 2014/15)
The target society can be either positive, to be won over, convinced or controlled, or 
negative, to be fought and destroyed. For the German right-wing, the population is 
regarded as a positive target for most parts of society are seen not as hostile but 
blindfolded. While some radical contrast societies differentiate between target and 
surrounding society, for the German neo-Nazis they are mostly congruent. The military 
or police, however, are considered institutions of the enemy state and to be infiltrated. 
In addition, efforts are being made to win over individuals within these institutions. 
Foreigners, Jews, and left-wing activists are considered enemies. The German neo­
Nazis view the target society as a social and political battleground that is to be won over 
in order to re-erect the German Reich, whereby the geographical area of pre- WWII 
Germany is the core territory. To accomplish this, the far-right generally seeks to take 
over Germany legally by elections.
The German right-wing connects to society through infrastructure and ideology. Visible 
elements of the former can be events like concerts, rallies, celebrations, study groups 
and even illegal actions such as terrorism or intimidation or attack of enemies. All these 
events serve an important function in networking and bonding that are necessary to 
maintain a collective identity. Infrastructure also has an economic dimension in order to 
finance operations and maintain independence from official institutions like social 
ministries. Lastly, for the formation of a collective identity, there is corporate design -  
all visual aspects related to the movement. Together, these infrastructural pillars connect 
the movement with the target society by establishing visibility, influence and promoting 
the far-right way of life.
Ideology is like a clustered set of political concepts, or macroscopic structural 
arrangements that assign meaning to political concepts such as freedom, equality,
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democracy, justice, power, and rights. This ideology identifies issues of interest, 
provides a legitimate vocabulary, a set of enemy definitions and a vision for the future.
It is also important to note, that radical groups do not exist in a vacuum and have 
therefore to interact with their surroundings continuously, not only online but also 
offline. Thereby they try to appeal to the general public by claiming new topics that are 
of general concern. If some parts of the target society accept elements of the radical 
ideology this is considered a success for the group.
Because these groups are still embedded in general society and subject to its rules and 
laws some of its elements are impossible to openly display and live without a 
revolution. In Germany certain National Socialist symbols and elements of its ideology 
are illegal (biological racism for example). Therefore some sub-groups seek to establish 
alternative social environments where they can live out those illegal elements of their 
ideology. German neo-Nazis try to establish National Liberated Zones, which usually 
are small villages or areas where they control the economic and societal infrastructure in 
order to construct an ideologically purified society.
Despite perceived ideological unity, there can, in fact, be inconsistencies that cause 
friction within the group. There may, for example, be tensions between negative and 
positive conceptions of the target society: while the police is regarded as an enemy, it is 
also a valuable target for recruiting efforts. In addition, the need to recruit more people 
to the cause necessitates intense communication with the target society which may bring 
unwanted influences into the group, risking damage to the ideological core.
Koehler also points out a very important fact regarding movement hierarchy and how it 
is perceived by the public: the foot soldiers, for example, skinheads, of far-right groups 
are very visible and perceived to be very dangerous and radicalized. The movement's 
upper ranks like lawyers and doctors, however, are often perceived as merely 
conservative or extreme, but not as a threat, though they may be more dangerous to 
society in the long term. (Koehler, 2014)
Conceptualizing the right-wing online as a contrast society provides a framework on 
how to assess how members and elements interact with each other and create an 
alternative reality online as well as how they connect to the wider online population. 
Twitter is a convenient platform to communicate with a large audience. Especially 
through the use of hashtags, a larger conversation is established that can solidify 
existing beliefs and ideology but also reaches the broader Twitter community.
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4. Analysis
This chapter contains the analysis of the German right-wing. In the first sub-chapter, 
German right-wing actors and their ideology are introduced. This is followed by an 
overview of the German online landscape in subchapter 4.2, which contains a section on 
the political relevance of social media activity, a quick overview of media use in 
Germany in general as well as an introduction to media use of the right-wing. Sub­
chapter 4.3, on right-wing actors on Twitter seeks to answer the sub-question: “How 
does the German right-wing operate on Twitter?”. Therefore, Twitter accounts of the 
political parties, movements, and groups introduced in sub-chapter 4.1 are analyzed, to 
establish how they operate on Twitter. This step also serves the purpose of identifying 
popular themes in the form of hashtags that will be analyzed in sub-chapter 4.4, to 
establish how the German right-wing as a contrast society is portrayed on Twitter 
networks.
4.1 German right-wing actors and ideology
In the West, there are three distinct waves of right-wing and xenophobic mobilization in 
the postwar era. The immediate postwar period was coined by McCarthyism in the 
United States, French Poujadism, the Socialist Reich Party in Germany and the Italian 
Social Movement. In the 1960s and 1970s, this was followed by the American Wallace 
movement, the National Democratic Party (NPD) in West Germany, Powellism and the 
National Front in the United Kingdom and the continuation of the Italian Social 
Movement. During the first two waves, the major actors were a lot more backward 
oriented and often revered practices, ideas and regimes that are fundamentally opposed 
to liberal democracy, such as biological racism, segregation in the American South and 
the dictatorial Third Reich. During the third wave of mobilization, from the 1980s on, 
right-wing parties, that are distinct from their predecessors, established themselves in 
most Western democracies. This third wave is coined by a complete renewal of the far- 
right and its politics of xenophobia and can be discerned as a general modernization 
shift that occurred during the 1968 leftist movements. This modernization shift also 
included the transition of Western industrial societies into post-industrial ones,
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necessitating the development of new political dynamics. In addition, the period 
between the 1970s and 1990s saw a new intellectual movement, the New Right, which 
was a key driving force of ideological renewal. The New Right developed 
ethnopluralism as a departure from biological racism and white superiority and instead
advocated for a segregation of cultures and ethnicities -  a global apartheid. It served as 
a counter model to multiculturalism and defended the legitimacy of a European 
resistance to cultural mixing. While the New Right as a movement is dead, its ideas 
have survived and entered the political debate. None of the contemporary right-wing 
political parties advocate for a return to pre-democratic political orders, they all 
highlight their support for democratic constitutions and the republican principles, but 
with a clear focus on defensive ultra-nationalism. (Minkenberg, 2013)
Whereas the general population has increased its acceptance of plurality over the past 
decades, xenophobia, Islamophobia and chauvinism are still widespread and have 
recently grown in some population segments. To date, the German far-right has caused 
149 deaths since 1989. The number of physical and psychological injuries, however, is 
much larger. In 2011, 16.873 politically motivated far-right crimes have been 
documented; most of them (11.475) were propaganda crimes. The latter refer to 
activities like for example the use of anti-constitutional symbols. There were 1.377 
cases of damage to property, 1.065 cases of Volksverhetzung (incitement of the people) 
and 128 cases of coercion or threat. All in, a right-wing crime is recorded once every 
hour in Germany. (Schellenberg, 2013)
Victim advice centers, human rights organizations as well as international institutions 
criticize that there is a discrepancy between government data and data from non­
governmental organizations regarding politically motivated right-wing violence and 
crimes of prejudice. In 2012, the government counted 106 murders since 1990, but 
various journalists and representatives of victim advice centers have recorded 149 
deaths. The Amadeu Antonio Foundation even counts 182 fatalities. In their criticism, 
aforementioned groups point out that crimes of prejudice are often ignored by officials 
because the perpetrators cannot be assigned to any right-wing group and the act was 
consequently not documented as a racist one. In this context, it is worth noting, that the 
far-right scene also seeks to infiltrate the state's political and security apparatus. There 
have been studies on racism among German police officers, but research on security
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authorities as players in the right-wing scene and their potential role in spreading far- 
right no-go zones and hegemonies has just begun. (Schellenberg, 2013) Yet, as Koehler 
points out, the infiltration of the state apparatus is, in fact, part of the wider strategy to 
take over Germany politically.
Right-wing actors in Germany
The most influential parties today are the National Democratic Party of Germany 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), Die Rechte (The Right) and the 
AfD.
The NPD was founded in 1964 and succeeded to unite several far-right splinter groups. 
Many of its officials were former Nazis and the party propagated National Socialist, 
anti-communist and conservative Catholic elements. While it quickly saw its support 
dwindle, the party overcame political marginalization under the chairmanship of Udo 
Voigt between 1996 and 2011. Under Voigt, a new and more radical manifesto was 
worked out. The party is openly anti-establishment and propagates a biological theory 
of race, race-based policy and the expropriation and deportation of Germans with an 
immigration background. In 1998, the NPD introduced a three-pillar concept which is 
designed to liberate it from its role as a party that competes in elections without a 
significant presence in society. Those strategic campaign pillars were designed for the 
medium-term political struggle. The first two pillars are the fight for the streets and the 
fight for the minds; they are based on the assumption that the party will only gain 
political power if it can mobilize its sympathizers in the streets. These two pillars are 
synonymous to Koehler's assessment: the streets and minds are a battleground to be 
won over. In the NPD's approach there is a big discrepancy between its communication 
with voters in pledges and electoral manifestos, in which it portrays itself relatively 
moderate, and its internal communication, like educational brochures for cadres, which 
are a lot more radical. Once the first two pillars have succeeded the party plans to 
increase its educational activities, train party members and create intellectual networks 
to achieve the third pillar: the fight for voters and parliaments. This, as Koehler points 
out, represents the final stage: taking over Germany by elections in order to re-establish 
the German Reich. In 2004, a fourth pillar was added and which seeks to unite the right­
wing scene to win the struggle for an organized will. (Schellenberg, 2013) These pillars 
draw a very clear picture of the NPD as a contrast society. It seeks to win over the
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minds and streets in order to “redirect the Target Society towards the (ideologically 
desired direction” (Koehler, 2014 p.30). By adding the fourth pillar, Voigt successfully 
gave members of previously prohibited parties and groups a new home inside the NPD, 
which caused a further radicalization of the party (Brandstetter, 2016). Ultimately the
party seeks to turn Germany into its ideologically purified vision -  legally -  by means 
of election.
The NPD has been establishing flourishing ties with the right-wing subculture since the 
90s. This rendered the party more radical and while it had previously been composed of 
aging ex-Nazis, today it actively seeks young people and tries to induce them with 
leisure activities and free music CDs. Especially the CD NPD Schulhof (NPD 
Schoolyard) which has been issued in several editions is indicative of how much more 
radical the party has become. The party's expansion into a movement helps attract 
young people. This way, ideology, and infrastructure can be used to connect to society. 
In addition, the movement structure can help to avoid repressive state instruments, as 
subcultural activities are a lot more difficult to track and monitor.
While it is apparent that the NPD rejects the German constitution, previous attempts to 
ban the party have failed. Attempts in the early 2000s primarily failed for strategic 
reasons because German security services had penetrated the NPD and a ban would 
have driven it underground and penetration under these conditions would have been 
difficult to maintain. (Schellenberg, 2013) This signifies Sedgwick's conflict of interest 
between competing agendas: while the NPD is a threat for the integration agenda, its 
infiltration is valuable for the security agenda. In addition, as Sedgwick argues, in 
security terms it may be wise to allow an organization to continue because it offers a 
less radical alternative to other groups (Segdwick, 2010). To some extent, the latter 
backfired because members of banned extremist groups joined the NPD and drove it 
towards further radicalization. (Schellenberg, 2013) The most recent attempt to ban the 
party was in 2017. The Federal Constitutional Court declined the Federal States' request 
to ban the party because there is no conclusive evidence that there is a noticeable threat 
to the liberal democratic order. The court argued that the party neither has a general 
tendency for criminal action, nor control over extremists that are organized in 
movements (outside the state ‘system') nor has created any nationally liberated zones in 
which the state has lost its power. (Lichdi, 2017) Although the party has regularly 
suffered from repressive measures by the German state, as well as fights between its
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radical and more moderate factions and has been subject to internal scandals and public 
scrutiny after the discovery of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) (Schellenberg, 
2013), it remained the most successful German right-wing party until the emergence of 
the AfD (Steffen, 2017). While during election campaigns both parties use similar 
paroles, the AfD has a much more moderate public image, which cost the NPD votes 
(Pfahl-Traughber, 2016).
The AfD party was founded in 2013 and with its populism and exaggeration of political 
crises like the Euro- and migration crises successfully gained support in the population. 
It portrays itself as an outsider to the system and offers simple answers to complex 
problems which appeals to its voters. It originally began as a Euro-skeptic party, then 
turned into an anti-immigration party (Häusler, 2016) and is now increasingly moving 
to the far-right (Lüdeke, 2018, Fieber, 2017, Ayyadi, 2017). Its members are former 
members of the established conservative German parties, as well as medium- to far- 
right parties. The AfD considerably shifted to the right at its 2015 federal party 
conference when Frauke Petri won the election for party chairmanship against Bernd 
Lucke, a much more liberal opponent, because she rallied for the party's right-wing's 
support. This caused the party's more liberal wing under Lucke to split-off and found 
the Alliance for Progress Party (Allianz für Fortschritt). In 2015/16, the AfD 
successfully used the migration crisis to gain more support and especially its regional 
associations in Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt moved considerably towards a right-wing 
nationalist people's party. (Häusler, 2016) In the last years members in leading positions 
have made increasingly controversial remarks1, which at first caused internal 
discussions, but now remain completely uncommented. This demonstrates that a right­
wing ideology has become the norm for the party. (Ayyadi, 2017) Another indication of 
this is an AfD event in February: there, the not the party, but its audience stunned the 
public with its chanting of slogans associated with the German extreme-right. This too, 
showcases that the AfD increasingly attracts right-wing extremists (Lüdeke, 2018). In 
2017, a WhatsApp group chat of AfD Thuringia was leaked, which counts as further 
evidence towards the AfD's classification as a right-wing, as opposed to a populist
1 Björn Höcke, head of the AfD Thuringia has repeatedly and publicly made radical statements such as 
calling Berlin's Holocaust memorial a memorial of shame, the migration crisis a global conspiracy to 
weaken Europe as well as explicit references revealing his biological racism. Other leading party 
members have made statements revealing their Islamophobia and contortion of WWII (Ayyadi, 2017).
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party. André Poggenburg, head of AfD Saxony-Anhalt, for example, commented
phrases like “Germany for the Germans” (Deutschland den Deutschen), and “national
defense and defense against terrorism. And... expansion o f the outer borders?'” 
(Landesverteidigung und Terrorabwehr. U nd. Erweiterung der Außengrenzen'?) (as
cited in Fieber, 2017). Such statements further underline the party's shift towards the 
extreme-right. (Fieber, 2017)
Die Rechte is a political party that was founded in 2012 by members that had left the 
right-wing party German People's Union (Deutsche Volks Union) because it merged 
with the NPD. The party portrays itself ‘as extreme-right', but not as extreme as the 
NPD. In fact, however, members of comradeships banned due to their extremeness, 
occupy high positions within Die Rechte. Many of its members are known to authorities 
for their attempts at intimidation and violent assaults against journalists, police and 
political opponents. (Schmidt, 2017) It has departments in 13 federal states, whereby 
North Rhine Westphalia has most members, as members of neo-Nazi groups that were 
banned in 2012 migrated into the party. The party organizes public events like 
demonstrations, provides informational points and distributes leaflets. Its main 
ideological focus is coined by a racist, anti-foreigners and anti-Islam stance. (Die 
Rechte, 07.2018) During the regional election campaign, it called for the maintenance
of the German identity and demanded an end to the German ‘war-guilt-complex'. 
Ideally, all borders should temporarily be closed and armed guards be positioned and
refugees should be detained in a secured area -  just like Guantanamo, but without 
torture (as cited in Porträt: Die Rechte, MDR).
Aside from political parties, there is also a heterogeneous network of far-right 
movements and subcultures in Germany. During the 70s and 80s neo-Nazi 
Kampfgruppen (battle groups) formed in addition to new radical parties. These battle 
groups participated in paramilitary exercises to prepare for a national revolutionary 
overthrow of the Federal Republic of Germany. 1992 saw a wave of bans following 
attacks on asylum seekers. In reaction to this, movement leaders restructured organized 
neo-Nazism and from this time on, groups have formed without state certification (for 
example associations). Thus, instead of official networks that may be subject to 
prosecution, they set up a network of local Kameradschaften (neo-Nazi comradeships) 
that operated autonomously. With this strategy, representatives of the comradeships,
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also called Freie Kräfte (Free Forces) successfully set themselves apart from other 
right-wing parties who they accused to be too legalistic and parliamentary. Today the 
comradeships are the most dynamic German neo-Nazi associations and their 
organizational structure is exported to other countries. Their members are aggressive 
right-wing rockers, militant neo-Nazis, and right-wing youths. These groups are often 
responsible for violent attacks and the establishment of no-go zones. Yet, they only 
attract public attention when members carry out terrorist activities or when weapons are 
found. Some comradeships have been banned by the courts, yet the development of 
right-wing extremism in Germany shows that the same people continuously operate 
under new structures. Since the failed attempt to ban the NPD, the relationship between 
the comradeships and the party has improved, because the latter emerged from this test 
more mature. They now view the NPD as a part of the national resistance and have all 
joined it. (Schellenberg, 2013) Because movement members are also represented in the 
NPD and based on the fact that the comradeships act secretively and are difficult to 
track on public social media, they will not be included in the analysis. For the sake of 
completion, however, they are included here.
The Identitarian Movement (Identitäre Bewegung, IB) represents a new, modern far- 
right and primarily seeks to attract youths. It was founded as an association in 2014, 
inspired by the French Bloc Identitaire. It has 400 to 500 members that are organized in 
15 regional associations. The movement tries to distinguish itself from the traditional 
far-right and adopts guerrilla tactics that are usually associated with the left, like 
fastening banners to the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The movement films campaigns 
like this and then spreads the material on social media. Members hand out brochures 
and stickers and online the movement sells its music, posters, and accessories. This 
way, a corporate identity is created, constituting a visual aspect of contrast societies. 
Overall, the Identitarians portray themselves as modern and cool, but intellectual at the 
same time. Some extremism experts believe that it is this mixture makes rebellious 
youths easily susceptible to radicalization, especially due to the fact that the leftist scene 
has become less shocking than the far-right scene. The Identitarians have been watched 
by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitutions since August 2016, due to 
their radicalization and anti-asylum stance and their general rejection of democratic 
values like equal rights, pluralism and human rights (Simon, 2018). In Austria, some of 
the movement's key figures face trial in court for forming a criminal association and
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incitement. This demonstrates that the Identitarians are indeed on the far-end of the 
right-wing spectrum. In addition, in the course of the investigation, a video surfaced 
which showed the Austrian movement's leader say that trolling and hating are standard 
online maneuvers (Identitäre vor Gericht, 2018). This is shocking, yet unsurprising and 
an aspect of the movement's online ‘strategy' that will be assessed in the following sub­
chapters.
Reconquista Germanica (RG) is an online community that was responsible for various 
right-wing social media campaigns during the 2017 federal elections. This alone makes 
it an interesting subject for analysis. Because it is a very new phenomenon and its 
organization is very secretive, not much is known about it. To avoid repetition and not 
take away from the social network analysis, RG will not be discussed in detail here.
When introducing the actors in Germany's far-right scene, the NSU also needs to be 
mentioned. In 2011, the German police accidentally uncovered a far-right terrorist cell 
when looking for thieves. When they tracked two suspects Uwe Mundlos and Uwe 
Böhnhardt to their mobile home, they shot themselves to avoid custody. Their 
accomplice Beate Zschäpe was taken into custody shortly after, when she tried to set 
fire to their shared apartment to destroy evidence. The trio has been active for around 
one decade and killed at least ten people, carried out bomb attacks and robbed at least 
fifteen banks and one food discounter. The money taken there was used to finance 
activities like the production of an anti-Semitic Monopoly game (Progromoly) and a 
film that glorifies violence. The investigation into the case has uncovered that militant 
right-wing extremism does not involve autonomous individuals but in fact a complex 
network. A 2007 audio tape recorded a conversation between two prominent neo-Nazis 
discussing the situation of Zschäpe, Mundlos, and Böhnhardt with another person. Also, 
some of the acts committed by the trio were known to the extreme right-wing 
community. The right-wing music group Gigi und die braunen Stadtmusikanten (Gigi 
and the Brown Town Musicians) published a CD in 2010 that contains a song called 
Döner Killer (Kebab Killer), which praises the NSU's crimes. The extreme right 
community also integrated signs and symbols into their lives, like clothing with the 
phrase Killerdöner nach Thüringer Art (Killer Kebab the Thuringian way) and the Pink 
Panther character and song, which both featured in the NSU's film. (Schellenberg, 
2013)
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Of course, there are more right radical actors in Germany, though introducing them all 
goes beyond the limits of this paper. In addition, many are positioned on the verge of 
right-wing extremism and operate in grey zones. It can, therefore, be difficult to clearly 
distinguish between right-wing and right-wing extremist actors.
Right-wing Ideology
In order to provide an overview of the right-wing's ideology and visions, this section 
introduces the NPD's ideology in detail. While there are many far-right organizations in 
Germany, the NPD is one of the oldest and, due to the fact that it is a party with a 
political program, its ideology and goals are easily accessible.
In line with Koehler's argument, that certain elements of the far-right ideology cannot 
be openly expressed, the party does not talk about National Socialist ideology or issues 
that fall under the penal code, openly. A revision of its political lexicon as well as 
statements and brochures, however, reveals its close ideological affiliation with the 
Hitler regime. The NPD and comradeships seek to overcome the ‘system'. Popular 
terms like ‘system', ‘system parties', ‘system press' and ‘system politicians' have first 
been used by the NSDAP. In order to overcome the system, they seek to reestablish the 
German Reich. It is argued that the German Reich never ceased to exist, but instead has 
been incapable of action since the arrest of Hitler's successor Donitz by the British 
occupying power. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany is forced upon the 
country by the occupiers. In addition, the Germans were never allowed a plebiscite 
about the German Basic Law, which therefore lacks legitimacy. This mindset signifies 
the party's rejection of the German political system and clearly states its goal: to 
overcome the Federal Republic of Germany. (Van Hüllen, 2008)
As mentioned, the party regards ‘the system' as its enemy; this includes political 
institutions, core values of democracy ( which are decried as human rights ideology and 
the Western community of ideology), the principle of open societies with international 
contacts and relations (‘multiculti', globalism, one world system), free market economy 
and world trade and sometimes specific political actors (system politicians). Especially 
the United States, its political system, multicultural and tolerant society, its economic 
system and military potential provides an ideal enemy for the right-wing scene. In 
addition, the US is blamed much more than the Soviets, for conquering the NS regime. 
Thereby the party profits from a continued subliminal anti-Americanism in the old
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federal states (pre-1990 Germany) that continues despite successful democratization. It 
is believed, that to establish world dominance, the US relies on its financial 
establishment, whose key players are Jews, or people that are associated with Zionism 
or Israel.
The core of the right-wing's worldview is anti-Semitism. Due to its culpability, this 
cannot be publicly expressed, yet becomes clear when digging deeper into the ideology. 
The NPD avoids antisemitic statements and instead favors suggestive hints and 
secondary Antisemitism (Jews abuse the Holocaust's memory to trap Germans in their 
guilt and derive more and more material benefits from it). (Van Hüllen, 2008) 
Conspiracy theories are directly connected to the enemy image: due to the fact that the 
latter is more often an emotional construct than real observable individuals or groups, 
they are difficult to prove. The enemy, therefore, remains anonymous and operates in 
secret, hiding behind reality as we see it and working on a global, evil plan. 
Traditionally, many conspiracy theories in far-right circles involve the United States and 
Jews. The September 11 attacks, for example, are considered to be an inside job, in 
order to allow the US control over oil resources in the Middle East. (Van Hüllen, 2008) 
A conception of the true-to-life idea of man (lebensrichtiges Menschenbild) serves as 
the basis for the NPD's far-right racial ideology. In a Darwinist fashion, man struggles 
for survival, whereby the strong win and the weak perish. This struggle between strong 
groups, people, nations, and races against weaker ones -  which are generally considered 
inferior and unlivable -  is the core of the far-right idea of man. Willingness to admit to 
this philosophy varies among the far-right groups. While the NPD avoids addressing the 
inhumane foundation of its political philosophy, the comradeships openly display their 
beliefs. The NPD does, however, accuse other political parties of following a wrong 
idea of man, which defines man as naturally good and equal. (Van Hüllen, 2008) These 
views find expression in a profound xenophobia and in Germany specifically 
Islamophobia and hostility towards non-conservative lifestyles, such as same-sex 
partnerships, partnerships without marriage and/ or children and women in careers.
The NPD's disregard for human rights makes it a threat to Germany's free liberal order,
especially if the far-right expands its influence in society. The true-to-life image of man 
finds political expression in the people's community (Volksgemeinschaft). Folklore and 
culture are considered to be the foundation of human dignity. Language, culture, and 
customs are central tenets of human identity. The people's community is therefore
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based on shared ancestry and aims at creating an ethnically homogenous population. 
‘Others' are therefore ostracized. Also, the people's community is more important than 
the individual. Because folklore and culture make up human dignity, a foreigner who 
lives in Germany is not only not a member of the people's community; he or she also 
has no human dignity. This finds expression in the demands to return refugees to their 
home countries and the rejection of immigration on the whole. In the right-wing's 
mindset, this is the only way to serve the greater good and to have a healthy people's 
community. Just as Koehler points out, all foreigners are enemies. Because this is an 
integral part of the radical right as a contrast society, evidence of it on Twitter will be 
analyzed later. In addition, the people's community is all-encompassing and 
contribution is compulsory. Deducting from the NPD's demand to transform prisons 
into work camps, contribution also includes forced labor. The NPD's members believe 
that they alone comprehend the interests of the people's community which signifies its 
dictatorial ambitions. Human rights are considered instruments of globalization that 
ought to help the United States attain world dominance. (Van Hüllen, 2008) The liberal 
regime and its left-wing activists -  as pointed out by Koehler - are often blamed for 
society's ills. Evidence of this will be included in the Twitter analysis in chapter 4.3 and 
4.4.
In the past, the right-wing has made references to the occidental culture and 
Christianity. Today, however, the NPD and comradeships are atheists with a neo-pagan 
vision of society. The fact that pagan-Germanic sagas are set in a world of struggle 
against nature and violence and state building and trade were non-existent relates 
historic Germanic paganism closely to neo-Nazism and its visions for society. In 
addition, Christian values like peace and altruism are diametrically opposed to neo­
Nazism. Nonetheless, the NPD does not include neo-pagan elements in its official party 
program; they are however available for purchase in its online warehouse (Deutsches 
Warenhaus). The warehouse also sells a lot WWII military literature -  since the spread 
of NS literature is punishable, the armed forces (Wehrmacht) and the armed wing of the 
SS (Waffen-SS) are glorified extensively in these books. (Van Hüllen, 2008) Such 
economic infrastructure provides the scene with important funds and also provides 
visible elements that help to shape identity. There is, in fact, a wide range of neo-Nazi 
apparel, music, and symbols that are designed to appeal to susceptible youths. Far-right 
groups sponsor different events like concerts that are supposed to attract young
35
supporters -  they are an important element of the far-right’s infrastructure. At such 
events, hate towards foreigners as well as the system of the Federal Republic of 
Germany is shouted and Sieg Heil chanting and Hitler salutes are common. Popular 
bands include Die Lunikoff Verschwörung (The Lunikoff Conspiracy), Faustrecht (Fist 
Law) and Feuer & Flamme (Fire & Flame).
The appearance of the classic neo-Nazi has changed too: the current fashion is rich in 
symbols that unambiguously communicate a message to insiders, while outsiders 
remain unaware. Typical far-right apparel is made up of dark shirts and hoodies with 
obscure far-right names, such as Thor Steinar and Consdable as well as symbols and 
codes, like the number 88, indicating HH, which stands for Heil Hitler. (Schellenberg, 
2013)
4.2 Mapping the online landscape
This sub-chapter seeks to provide an overview of relevant aspects of Germany’s online 
landscape, to serve as a background to the subsequent analyses. It starts with a section 
on the political significance of social media activity in order to clarify the potential of 
social media activity to have real-world consequences, as well as these processes’ 
dynamics. This is followed by a section on media use in Germany. Lastly, the far-right’s 
media use is analyzed.
Political Significance of Social Media Activity
Studies have shown that social media activity affects offline political participation. In 
her 2015 article, Shelly Boulianne conducts a meta-data analysis of current research on 
the relationship between social media use and political participation. Her meta-analysis 
assesses the results of 36 studies, from mostly well-established democracies, but also 
new ones (Chile and Singapore) and formal ones (Columbia, Egypt, and Tunisia) as 
well as China. She finds that there is an overall positive relationship between the use of 
social media and participation in civic and political life. However, regarding political 
dissent in the form of right-wing extremism, the studies the author relied on for the 
meta-analysis do not differentiate clearly enough between different types of 
participation, like participation in a demonstration and voting. Therefore Boulianne 
concludes that it is difficult to isolate the relationship between social media and protest.
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(Boulianne, 2015) It nonetheless confirms that there is a correlation between social 
media activity and political participation.
Kahne and Bowyer demonstrate that especially a high number of weak ties on social 
media correlate with offline political action. This is due to the fact, that individuals with 
large social networks are more likely to be exposed to political content and discussion. 
Thereby the authors distinguish between friendship directed activity (using social media 
to communicate with friends and family) and interest directed activity (using social 
media for ones' personal interests). They found out that friendship directed activity 
promotes later engagement in online participatory politics and interest directed online 
activity promotes offline political activity. (Kahne and Bowyer, 2018) Especially the 
latter contributes significant support for the approach taken in this paper: the German 
right-wing uses social media to address issues of public concern like immigration, 
pedophilia and animal welfare to gain supporters. If engagement with personal interests 
on social media does promote offline political activity, then social media uses and 
abuses by the right-wing carry political significance, for it draws others towards its 
ideology, encourages offline participation and may ultimately affect public opinion and 
electoral behavior.
In his study on social media and protest behavior Valenzuela assesses protest behavior 
and the use of social media as a news source, for political opinion expression, for 
joining causes and to gain mobilizing information. In their function as news outlets, 
social media become venues for interpersonal discussion, as well as reflection and 
learning, which motivate to participate. Opinion expression on social media similarly 
leads to political engagement as political discussions do (Valenzuela, 2013). This is an 
important insight because it demonstrates that mere opinion expression is sufficient to 
trigger political engagement. Carefully chosen political facts and elaborate discussions 
are thus not necessary to convince people to engage in politics. For policy-makers this 
implies that there is indeed a wide range of option to engage citizens. However, it also 
demonstrates how easy it can be for the right-wing to reach out to others.
The author finds a positive relationship between the frequency of social media use and 
protest behavior: frequent users are almost eleven times more likely to participate in 
demonstrations than non-users. Heavy users are seven to nine times more likely to 
express their demands to authorities and in the mass media. In addition, the probability 
of attending a demonstration increases from 4 percent to 33 percent across the whole
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spectrum of the frequency of social media use. Valenzuela concludes that social media 
serves as a tool for, instead of a cause of, political action. (Valenzuela, 2013) Regarding 
the present research, this is an important baseline assumption: it underlines the potential 
influence that the right-wing has on social media.
Media use in Germany
An annual report on the changing environment of news across countries finds that 
although echo chambers and filter bubbles are real, users of social media on average 
experience more diversity than nonusers. In order to establish a more nuanced 
understanding of polarization, the authors mapped the respondents' political beliefs on a 
left-right spectrum, together with the news they consume. The mid-point on the 
spectrum represents the respondents' mid-point of political opinion and the size of each 
bubble the volume of consumption of each brand. Figure 2 below shows Germany's 
audience map for the top online news brands, and Figure 3, the same for the United 
States.
Figure 2: Audience map for top online news brands -  Germany (Newman et al., 2017, p. 21)
What becomes evident is the great contrast between the two: while the US graph shows 
a deeply polarized media landscape, reflecting a very polarized society, the media 
brands in Germany are clustered around the center. In general, German media can be 
described as corporatist and does not sufficiently challenge economic and political 
elites. During the height of the refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016, this became an issue of
contempt for many right-wing groups: they revived the term Lugenpresse (lying press)
from the Nazi era to highlight the perceived left-wing bias and suppression of debate.
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Figure 3: Audience map for top online news brands -  USA (Newman et al., 2017, p. 20)
Nonetheless, 42 percent of German respondents claim they believe news media is 
reliable in helping them to distinguish fact from fiction. Newman et al. also find, that a 
significant number of people across all countries curate their social feeds and follow or 
add users for news and one in five blocks others based on the news they have posted.
To date, Germany is one of the countries with the toughest hate speech laws and is 
looking to make them even tougher in the age of social media. This was motivated by 
fears that false information or incitement may influence last year's election campaign. 
(Newman et al., 2017) Despite these efforts, however, the right-wing succeeded to 
highjack part of the political online debate. They organized on a private online platform 
that they label Reconquista Germanica and organized there to target for example a 
discussion on television between Merkel and her opponent Schulz on social media and 
succeeded in creating trending hashtags like #nichtmeinekanzlerin (not my chancellor). 
This happened with the help of sometimes thousands of activists, as well as bots. 
(Gensing and Kampf, 2018) The Reconquista Germanica phenomenon will be discussed 
in more detail in the subsequent subchapters. It appears, however, that the right-wing 
scene dynamically adapts to the changing media environment -  just as it adapted to the 
changing offline landscape, as pointed out earlier.
Media use by the right-wing
For radical movements, groups and also individuals, the Internet provides a space for 
ideological development and advancement. Many perceive it to be an open and 
anonymous space and are online more radical than offline. Due to its openness, 
everyone can participate and contribute to the ideology. Thereby, the broader movement 
is shaped by a plurality of thoughts and ideas, from which each individual can pick 
whichever strand suits him or her best and actively shape ideology. This can provide 
individuals with the feeling that they make crucial contributions and at the same time
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can convey the feeling that the movement gains critical mass and inspire them to 
increase their involvement. Due to the perceived feeling of security and importance to 
the cause, individuals may be driven towards further radicalization. This effect can be 
witnessed in right-wing clothing brands: the Internet is an important retailer space for 
right-wing merchandise like clothing and music, which provide the movement with 
important funds. Such brands have been shown to be in a race to the radical bottom: 
they have to be the most radical in order to convince customers and gain their loyalty, 
which has the side effect of encouraging more radicalism in their customers.
While there are some ‘Computer-Nazis' that are only active online, most take their 
activities to the next level. Therefore, “the Internet can be seen like a permanent 
gateway to offline political activism” (Koehler, 2014/15 p. 128). It is thus not separated 
from the real world, but dynamically connected to it. This dynamic interconnectedness 
can give activists and potential recruits an opportunity to convince themselves of the 
movement's strength and to commit to the cause. Due to the former, the Internet often 
poses as a gateway into a radical movement. Often, group members monitor chat 
forums on social media and step in at the right moment to lure people into discussions. 
(Koehler, 2014/15)
The right-wing scene has used the Internet since the 1990s. The first websites were not 
very appealing and mostly text-based. With the turn of the century, a new generation of 
right-wing extremists took to the Internet and created Web pages bearing obvious Nazi 
symbols, often illegal ones, denied the Holocaust and called for violence against 
foreigners. Those pages were aimed at reaching members of the scene. At the same 
time, the Internet was used for extensive networking and exchange of information. In 
the following years, the number of far-right websites increased and the contents became 
more and more professional. Today, right-wing websites are tailored to appeal to 
teenagers. Social media has added a further dimension to the far-right's online presence: 
hate speech can easily reach millions of people and thus, the use of social media is an 
important component of the scene's strategy. With the help of the Internet, the far-right 
scene has modernized significantly. Teenagers have turned into their most important 
target population and they are easily approachable on social media and video platforms. 
In 2010, 25 percent of teenagers between 12 and 19 years have encountered right-wing 
contents on the Web. (Glaser 2012) The NPD's news site German Voice (Deutsche
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Stimme) for example published a detailed article on how to create profiles on social 
media that portray the user as friendly and open and appealing to outsiders. Ultimately 
this aims to make the NPD visible outside of far-right groups and portray it as the party 
that citizens can vote for safely (Lang, Müller, Rafael and Wolf, 2010).
How exactly social media is used by the right-wing will be established in the subsequent 
chapters.
4.3 The German right-wing on Twitter
This subchapter seeks to establish how the German right-wing operates on Twitter. 
Therefore, in the following, prominent right-wing parties and groups on Twitter are 
analyzed. To diversify the analysis, important or controversial members' Twitter 
accounts are also included and if any popular or specifically promising content surfaces, 
this too will be included.
AfD on Twitter
The AfD has an official Twitter account (120.000 followers), as well as accounts for the 
federal states, its parliamentary group (19.100 followers) and the federal parliamentary 
groups and its magazine AfD Kompakt (15.200 followers). In the federal elections 
2017, the party was most successful in Saxony, where it gained 27 percent of the vote. 
Yet, afd_sachsen has merely 272 followers and five tweets. The Saxonian parliamentary 
group (afd_slt) has almost 5.100 followers and 2.400 tweets. Its Thuringian account, 
where it received 22.7 percent of the vote is more popular with almost 5.000 followers 
and 8.000 tweets. (Rohleder and Naumann, 2017) Geographic voting behavior, 
therefore, does not overlap with geographic Twitter activity. Yet in Saxony for example, 
the AfD was particularly popular in small rural municipalities. Rathmannsdorf, for 
example, has only 1.000 inhabitants and 46.2 percent voted for AfD (Zeisling, 2017). 
This may be based on the comparably old population: the average age there is 50 years 
(Freistaat Saxe, 2011), one of the eldest in Saxony.
Afd tweets around 16 tweets per day on average, mostly inflammatory banners and 
appeals that criticize for example the media, the German Bundeswehr, immigration 
politics, and Merkel. An example can be seen in Figure 4. The image shows Osama bin 
Laden's bodyguard Sami A. who was deported to Tunisia, despite an administrative
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court's ruling that he shall remain in Germany because he may be subject to torture. 
Sami A. was deported nonetheless because the court's ruling was communicated to the 
Office for Migration and Refugees when he was already on the plane to Tunisia. The 
affected administrative court voiced that his deportation was illicit. Thus, the federal 
government made efforts to return him. to Germany to rectify the satiation. (Diehl and 
Gathman, 2018)
++ Wie der Rechtsstaat vor die Hunde geht ++
Rückholung von Bin-Ladens 
Leibwächter angeordnetl
Figure 4: image example from afd, Alternative für Deutschland (afd), 14.07.2018, tweet
According to the AfD's interpretation of events, however, the return of bin Laden's 
bodyguard is unacceptable. The image it tweeted shows bin Laden and the German flag. 
The red banner on the top reads: “how the rule of law goes down the drain” and the 
white writing translates to: “return of bin Laden's bodyguard has been ordered”. This 
case provides a significant example of how parties like the AfD manipulate facts to 
further their agenda. Although hosting Osama bin Laden's bodyguard is unpleasant, his 
deportation was illegal and represents a violation of the rule of law. The AfD, however, 
argues the opposite and claims his return would be just that.
AfD mostly retweets the AfD in parliament, afdimbundestag (281 times), Alice Weidel 
(266 times), Jörg Meuthen (189), the party's official speaker and Georg Pazderski, 
deputy speaker and chair of AfD Berlin and the party's press office as well as AfD 
Kompakt (111 times each). To spread the word on issues the party wants to put on the 
agenda, afd asks its followers to retweet certain topics to increase visibility. In fact, 
some of its most retweeted tweets are a call for compulsory age tests for underage 
refugees (905 retweets and 1.296 favorites) and a tweet that calls for resistance to an 
EU-tax (866 retweets and 1.296 favorites). The first tweet also included a link to 
Facebook, where it got 2.045 likes and was shared 2.792 times.
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The account's followers appear to be rather diverse. Many accounts do not give away 
any information on their users' political orientation. Others can be easily identified as 
far-right, however, a survey of afd's 120.000 followers is very difficult. As it is a 
reasonably large political party it attracts the attention of all types of users, from 
supporters and voters to the opposition, journalists, and left-wing activists. Browsing 
through afd's followers, acewrex86 attracted attention due to his tweet containing a link 
to a private server on the Discord social network, called Ritterkreuzorden. In his tweet, 
acewrex86 invites all patriots, AfD and NPD members as well as the Right to join him 
there. The account only has 70 followers, so this tweet will probably not reach many but 
it represents an attempt to relocate the conversation to a more private place. Following 
the link, one gets directed to the aims and rules of the server. The stated goal is to return 
patriotism to the German population in order to help the AfD achieve electoral victories 
in the federal states as well as in the federal election 2021 and to help make Germany a 
more sovereign nation again in the long-term. The members' status is classified using 
military ranks. When users post a lot and appear trustworthy enough, they get promoted 
to higher ranks which automatically unlocks new discussion groups on the server. At the 
time of writing Ritterkreuzorden had only 63 members and is therefore rather small. 
However, on Discord, this group can network more freely and privately than on public 
spaces like Twitter. Therefore it can be assumed that there is a tendency for superficial 
networks to form on Twitter, that then migrate to more private places like on Discord.
Afd follows 767 accounts, many of them AfD functionaries, as well as journalists and 
news sites. Some accounts, however, are more ‘shady' like dunkeldenk. He has a 
German flag as well as two crossed swords in his username and in his bio he voices 
support for Brexit, AfD, and Trump. He tweets and retweets inflammatory content from 
various German and international users like refugee crime rates and fear of the deep 
state and Islam. None of the contents are particularly extreme; however, they 
unambiguously identify the user as a member of the far-right spectrum. The link 
included in dunkeldenk's bio leads to a more conclusive picture: it leads to the user's 
profile on Gab. Gab is an American based social network created as an alternative to 
Twitter and promotes itself as the Free Speech Social Network and has become a 
popular alternative for people who have been banned from Twitter. Andrew Torba, the 
founder of Gab believes there is a general trend towards limiting freedom of expression 
but claims to be no supporter of the alt-right. Gab's logo, a frog, however, bears an
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interesting resemblance to Pepe the frog, who is a popular meme in the far-right scene. 
Torba claims though that the frog represents a biblical reference to the plague of frogs 
in Exodus and signifies releasing the frogs on Silicon Valley to expose the corruption 
and censorship there. (Yates, 2016) While dunkeldenk's Twitter profile is more
moderate -  possibly to not get banned -  he does not hold back on his Gab account. An 
example is given in Figure 5.
O NosiIum Mliuf ‘MKrttad
Cj Billtamp
This Is why Islam is such a threat to any western nation They are loyal 
only to Sharia law. ano try their damndest to Impose It everywhere they go
M t is  M m «n.r.
p r a c t is in g
•l.r In n  11b o v »
Figure 5: dunkeldenk on Gab, 15.07.2018
He also reposts various posts by users who seek to reach out to their community 
because they were banned on Twitter and hope their followers will follow them to Gab. 
The fact that such posts are reposted on Gab signifies that much of the community is in 
fact already using the platform. The AfD itself also has various accounts on Gab, but 
none of them are in use.
Another interesting fact that came up during a brief survey of dunkeldenk's followers is 
the red cross many use in their names, together with the acronym QDF, as can be seen 
in a screenshot taken of his followers in Figure 6. This appears to be protest-behavior by 
the far-right scene on Twitter's new quality filters; QFD stands for Quality Filter 
Discrimination. Because Twitter has come increasingly under pressure to respond to 
fake accounts and hate speech it has introduced new quality filters in mid-2018. They 
render certain accounts' contents invisible if they are not clearly identifiable as ill- 
natured. (Heuzeroth, 2018) Protest in the form of red crosses and QFD can, therefore, be 
seen on many right-wing Twitter profiles. A more thorough analysis #QFD will be done 
in the subsequent sub-chapter.
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Returning to accounts whom afd follows, it can be observed that most are other party 
members. Their followers however, appear to be a lot more homogenous, than the 
official AfD's account. While the latter mainly tweets and retweets political contents of 
its popular members in high positions, its individual members also share more local 
contents and retweet non-AfD users. In fact, many party members' as well as local AfD 
groups' Twitter names bear the red cross and #QFD. AfD Heidelberg for example has 
included both in its name and bio. Its followers appear a lot more extreme in their views 
than the followers of AfD's official accounts that do not protest the quality filters.
Most official AfD accounts use Twitter for populist appeals to their followers regarding 
current political news. Thereby the party seeks to take any chance it can get to 
undermine the current government and its policies. Especially the AfD's official 
account reaches a large number of followers whom it seeks to convince with its 
inflammatory tweets. While the entire AfD's Twitter network is huge, it can be
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summarized that the followers of individuals appear to be much more radical and active 
on Twitter, then the followers of accounts like the AfD's parliamentary groups. In 
addition, some official accounts have adopted emblems of the right-wing online culture, 
such as the red crosses and #QFD hashtags that seems to connect the far-right scene on 
Twitter. Therefore, the AfD's overall Twitter presence succeeds to appeal to a broad 
public but general, albeit populist messages, as well as to the more radical community 
through its regional and individual accounts.
NPD on Twitter
The NPD does not have one official Twitter account, but a variety, like for example 
NPD Federal Organization (npdde), accounts for the Federal States and some cities. 
Npdde has almost 5.000 followers and tweets 4.7 times per day. There is no interaction 
with other users, save for Ronny Zasowk (ronnyzasowk), the party's chair, which npdde 
has retweeted once. The hashtags used are also very general and do not offer any 
insights. Zasowk, on the other hand, is more active. He has 1.600 followers and tweets 
two times per day. He frequently interacts with Martin Sellner (martin_sellner), co-chair 
of the Identitarian Movement Austria and a user called Heinrich Krug (heinrich_krug). 
A hashtag he often uses is #MerkelMussWeg (Merkel has to go), which is analyzed in 
the next chapter because it represents the far-right revisionist ambitions. His followers 
are a mixture of mostly German, but also some Dutch and American right-wing to right 
extreme users.
Npdde's tweets depict the situation in Germany bleak and threatening: there is, for 
example, a tweet about the Rabat-Process declaration that accuses the German 
government of having signed a deal that would allow for targeted mass-immigration to 
Europe by non-European immigrants. Also, refugees are branded as illegal immigrants 
and a recent ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court that declared the broadcasting 
fees constitutional is decried as ‘system-judges' supporting ‘system-journalists'. The 
NPD too rejects Germany's efforts to return Sami A. to Germany. It tweets: “this state 
is politically sick, morally degenerate and only pursues one goal: to harm the German 
people!!! In what other country would the judiciary insist on returning a foreign 
terrorist back to the host country???” (npdde, 16.06.2018) The NPD claims that the 
established parties (system-parties) are trying to mobilize their last reserves to gain
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votes by allowing mentally handicapped to vote, in order to portray the established 
parties in a harder situation than they really are in.
The regional NPD accounts are similar: NPD NRW has 2.149 followers and is not 
interactive, however, its third most used hashtag is #asylflut, portraying a negative and 
threatening image of the refugee crisis. NPD Thuringia provides mostly local 
information and updates on family events, concerts, and demonstrations and rather 
encourages offline meetings instead of online discourse. NPD Brandenburg is even less 
active, with no interaction at all and non-telling hashtags like #merkel.
While the NPD is the oldest right-wing political party in Germany and well connected 
to various movements, its Twitter accounts do not reveal much. This could be due to the 
fact that the party is very well connected to sub-cultural groups that are more appealing 
to youths. Also, advertising and recruiting may be conducted on other channels than on 
Twitter. This seems especially plausible because the party has to find a difficult balance 
between appealing to its supporters and not confirming the image of a party that is 
openly hostile to the German constitution -  which may scare off potential supporters.
Die Rechte
While The Right may not be the most popular party among voters, it appears to be well 
networked on Twitter. Its main Twitter account Die Rechte Bund (dierechtebund) only 
has 188 followers and eight likes. Die Rechte Bund tweets almost two times per day and 
has the most interaction with GesaSanivel, whom only has 338 followers but 27.200 
likes and tweets anti-right-wing content. One interesting hashtag dierechtebund uses 
frequently is #remigration, which will be included in the hashtag analysis later on. One 
of Die Rechte Bund's most recent and popular tweets concerns the summoning of 
Ursula Haverbeck to court. She is an 89-year-old holocaust denier and currently serves a 
sentencing for incitement of the people. She is summoned to appear in a Hamburg court 
in September -  which is a 250km journey from her current prison in Bielefeld. Rumors 
have spread that her transport to Hamburg will take a few days, due to the fact that it 
supposedly will be a collective transport with multiple prisoners. The far-right scene 
and Die Rechte Bund decry it as a death-ride, cruelty and a multiple-day-odyssey. 
Although prisoners affected by their health -  due to age for example -  are transported 
individually, the right-wing scene uses her transport to Hamburg to rally support for
47
their cause. (Bexte, 2018) Die Rechte Bund also accuses a local radio station of 
spreading fake news because it broadcasted that the number of asylum seekers in the 
region has decreased by a third (Radio Erft, 2018) Die Rechte Bund claims that this is 
fake news (dierechtebund, 17.07.2018), but does not provide any evidence of it. Like 
other right-wing political Twitter accounts, Die Rechte Bund too twists reality and 
creates its own facts.
The vast majority of its followers are immediately identifiable as right-wing. There are
few profiles without pictures, banners, and bios -  most of them have also no tweets or 
just a few. Thus, in contrast to for example the AfD, Die Rechte appears to have only 
followers that actually share its opinions.
There are also various regional Twitter accounts. The account with the largest amount 
of followers is Die Rechte Dortmund (dortmundsrechte), with 2.319 followers. This 
account is a lot more active on Twitter. Together with the NPD, the Right is represented 
in Dortmund's city council -  this group has a Twitter account (npddrimratdo) that Die 
Rechte Dortmund has retweeted 71 times. Another user that was retweeted 69 times is 
Aktionsgruppe Dortmund (aktionsgruppedo), a non-partisan organization of right-wing 
activists in Dortmund. Die Rechte Dortmund also makes extensive use of hashtags: 
#dortmundecho was used 331 times. The latter appears to be a re-invention of 
Deutschland Echo. On its Twitter feed, there is a lot of content about demonstrations, 
protest activities, repeated advertisement for a store that sells various propaganda 
materials and updates on members of the scene who are in court or jail. Overall, the 
Right's Dortmund account appears to seek to mobilize its followers to engage in offline 
action. Aktionsgruppe Dortmund appears to follow the same objective.
Among Die Rechte Dortmund's followers are a number of accounts with red crosses, 
and QFDs in their names, as well as accounts with various symbols and pictures 
associated with the far-right. A quick look at some followers' profiles reveals a very 
different perception of the current political situation as well as societal issues. One 
follower, whiteeuropeeu, for example, retweets White Genocide Info: “#DIVERSITY
means chasing down the LAST WHITE PERSON. #WhiteGenocide #StandUpForEurope 
#ItsOkayToBeWhite” (wginfonetorg, 13.05.2018). This tweet is not an exception; the 
user tweets inflammatory, racist content like for example a picture with a large Muslim 
family and a caption that reads: “many Muslims take on a second or third wife and us 
Germans take on a second or third job to finance their lives” (whiteeuropeeu,
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08.05.2018). This twisting of facts and attribution of blame can be seen across Die 
Rechte Dortmund's followers. Wolf4641, for example, retweets ronaldglaeser, that 
police in Hamburg spend their time controlling cars in diesel-car-free zones while there 
are rape and murder in the streets (ronaldglaeser, 23.07.2018). Salveduce, whose name 
reminds of the ‘Heil Hitler'  parole, frequently includes links to a news site called 
Politikversagen (the failure of politics) that lists alleged crimes committed by foreigners 
in Germany. Another follower (janandrus45) is very active on Twitter and tweets 19 
times per day. His tweets contain racist, nationalist and homophobic content, like for 
example: “neither Obama, nor the EU, but Victor Gorban deserves the Nobel Peace 
Prize. There are 8% white people in this world and he does everything for the white 
race to survive. He protects us from the deadly enemies that are amongst us” 
(janandrus45, 22.07.2018).
The analysis of the Right party's Twitter activity and environment shows that news 
contents are manipulated or presented incompletely in order to mobilize the scene and 
potential new supporters. It appears that any content that challenges the Right's world­
view is declared fake and a lie. This way the party consolidates its own positions, 
delegitimizes the established parties, news, and societal norms and may gain new 
supporters through its populist appeals.
Identitarian Movement on Twitter
The official Twitter account of the Identitarian Movement (ibdeutschland) has 19.400 
followers. The NPD federal association (npdde) on the other hand has just below 5.000. 
This difference may be due to different images of the groups, as described elsewhere, 
and the fact that the Identitarian's target group is youths, who use social media more 
than elder generations.
Among the most retweeted and mentioned is patricklenart, official speaker of the 
movement. This is not surprising. Other accounts that are most retweeted are other IB 
accounts, as well as junge_freiheit, the Young Freedom newspaper, _laut_gedacht_ a 
right-wing YouTube channel, with 20.000 followers on YouTube and 3.200 followers 
on Twitter, that discusses current political issues satirically. Another one is a right-wing 
association from Brandenburg, zukunft_heimat that holds common far-right visions in 
order to create a better future. Lastly, there is 120_dezibel, an all-women protest 
movement that seeks to draw attention to the harm German immigration policy is
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causing German women. Most used hashtags include #ibd (IB Germany), #identitar 
(Identitarian), #deraustausch (the exchange), #defendeurope and #remigration.
The account's most retweeted tweet accuses the German media of not covering the 
whole picture regarding Syria: “what the German main-stream media conceals: the 
Syrian government has repeatedly asked all Syrians to return back home. The time for 
#remigration has come” (ibdeutschland, 10.07.2018). Whether this is true or not, the
situation for Syria's civil population remains dire and hardly warrants safe conditions
for families to return. Nonetheless, the movement portrays the situation in simple terms 
that may convince an un-reflected audience and claims that Syrian refugees are 
overstaying their welcome in Germany. In fact, the tweet's comments suggest that 
exactly this is the case. This particular tweet received 569 retweets and 950 likes. The
most liked tweet by IB states: “Nobody asked us when companies, politicians, and the 
leftist media instigated a process that destroys our home. We are the youth, that doesn't 
believe your lies anymore. We turned off the TV to do the thinking ourselves ”
(ibdeutschland, 22.01.2018). This tweet received 546 retweets and 1.197 likes. Here too, 
IB accuses the German media of untruthfulness. In addition, by not addressing what 
exactly is supposedly destroying their homes, its followers can project their grievances 
onto the message. This way, IB directly speaks to each individual follower and 
identifies the perpetrator at the same time. Thereby, it does not matter who exactly is to 
blame for what -  that matters is that the IB provides answers and ‘hears’ the peoples' 
concerns. The comment section is supportive and agrees with the statement -  IB’s 
strategy seems to work.
The Movement’s tweets are conspiratory, nationalist and xenophobic. IB claims that the 
‘great exchange’ (#DerGroBeAustausch) -  meaning an increase in the non-German 
population -  is neither a secret nor a conspiracy (ibdeutschland, 21.07.2018) Calling the 
immigration crisis ‘the great exchange’ implies that it was planned. In addition, 
claiming that this is a fact and not a conspiracy theory, lends the movement more 
credibility. Besides tweets like this, ibdeutschland shares details on informational 
events, music videos with Nazi-rap, laut_gedacht’s videos on current political issues 
and advertises for a project called Defend Europe. The latter is a project of the 
international Identitarian Movement. The link in Defend Europe’s Twitter bio directs to
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the French movement's Web presence, which shows a powerful two-minute propaganda
2
video that advertises for the movement2. For the Defend Europe mission, members from 
different European countries get together to counter the rescue of migrants at sea, which 
they label human trafficking. With chartered ships, they patrol the Mediterranean and 
return migrants back to the African continent (Mission: Defend Europe).
The review of IB's tweets and references to other accounts show that the IB acts very 
professionally and effectively online as well as offline. It targets young people and on 
its Twitter account, it connects politics with music, offline events, and sensational 
campaigns. This tactic is very successful. In addition, the IB also works on an app, 
called Patriot Peer that seeks to connect the movement's members. Through the app, 
members shall be able to locate one another and communicate. Thus, the app will be a
permanent link between the online and offline. In addition, users can collect points for
participation in political activities -  through this function the movement seeks to 
encourage participation in flash-mobs and other activities. The movement specifically 
seeks to channel anger into resistance using the app. Experts fear that this will further 
lower the threshold to partake in racist hate speech and right-wing violence in the
offline world. The app's release has however been delayed for several months, due to 
the Austrian leaders' trial in court. The German Federal Office of Criminal 
Investigation, as well as the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, also 
watch the developments closely. (Gurgen, 2018)
With 19.400 followers it is difficult to get a concise picture of who follows 
ibdeutschland. There are followers that use the red cross and QFDs in their names and 
bios, as well as many whose pictures and bios are self-explanatory. Also the reviewed 
accounts without any pictures or descriptions tweet right-wing content. However, of 
course, there are also followers who openly oppose the movement and its ideas. 
Ibdeutschland follows 199 accounts, many of them other IB accounts, like local German 
ones, as well as English, Irish, French and Spanish accounts. Einprozent.de is also 
affiliated with the movement. On its website, einprozent calls itself the first serious 
lobby group for German national interests and seeks to unite the resistance against the 
system. It has 10.000 followers and most current tweets concern a team of movement
2 The video can be watched here: https://generationidentitaire.org/presentation-eng/
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members who traveled to Malta to film a documentary about the so-called ‘trafficker- 
NGOs' that rescue migrants at sea.
The IB's large Twitter network and professional online presence provide vast data for 
analysis. Due to the limitations of this paper, a more detailed analysis of the Identitarian 
Movement is not possible. What this brief overview has shown, however, is that the 
Identitarian Movement is extremely successful in promoting its beliefs, gaining support 
and instrumentalizing current political issues and especially the refugee crisis for its 
cause. Its approach is professional and it employs means on different levels like 
campaigns in cities, demonstrations, flash-mobs, a vast online presence, youth-specific 
music, entertainment, soon an app and involvement in actual political issues, like 
immigration via the Mediterranean Sea. The message it spreads on Twitter is clear: the 
leftist media, corporate establishment, and system government lead the country 
purposefully towards national ruin. The movement employs half-truths and convincing- 
looking media to not appear conspiratory, but trustworthy. The reality it portrays online 
is bleak and needs organizations like the IB to get back on the right track.
Reconquista Germanica on Twitter
Reconquista Germanica (RG) is a channel on the social network ‘Discord'. Discord is 
designed as a platform for gamers and provides a chat app, message boards as well as 
video chats. Users can create groups that are called servers at Discord. The RG server 
was founded in 2017 by a YouTuber, whose channel is also called RG. Its founder aims 
to create the largest patriotic Discord server in Germany and thus, provide a ‘home' for 
all far-right online activists. Members on this server organize to influence debates on 
social media. Reconquista Germanica members were responsible for the social media 
manipulations during the 2017 German elections. (Ayyadi, 2018)
At the end of 2017, a journalist, Julia Ebner, observed the server undercover for six 
months. The server was founded in the summer of 2017 in order to support the AfD 
during the federal elections. On the server, it is stated: “we are in a state of war, in an 
information war” (Ebner, 2018). There, radical online activists coordinate hashtags and 
targets for their campaigns with the aim of manipulating social media algorithms and 
dictate the online discourse. With hashtags like #TrauDichDeutschland (dare it 
Germany) and #MerkelMussWeg (Merkel has to go), they managed to reach the top 
trending hashtags on social media in the week prior to the elections. Their online
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organization is inspired by military-style structures. At the time of writing the server has 
7.000 members. Online campaigns are called virtual battlefields, sniper missions or 
massive air bombardment. Users who participate are promoted to higher ranks on the 
server which ultimately shall be reflected in offline society too. (Ebner, 2018)
Reconquista Germanica's Twitter profile is called Reconquista Discord (discord_recon) 
and has 1.389 followers on Twitter. The account tweets 0.89 times per day and most 
often retweets a user called darksideofkek (10 times) and AfD politician André 
Poggenburg (9 times). Altrightleak is mentioned 13 times, followed by Martin Sellner 
of the Austrian Identitarian Movement with 9 times. The most often used hashtag is 
#reconquistagermanica.
Figure 7 shows an RG advertizing picture bearing the movement's logo together with a 
bayonet that shoots a wifi signal instead of bullets and the words: “we are many”. It is a 
martial call to action and the means are social media.
Figure 7: Reconquista Germanica poster (discord_recon, 06.03.2018)
Many of its recent tweets concern Reconquista Internet (RI). The latter is a campaign by 
the German TV host Jan Böhmermann. He opened a Discord server called Reconquista
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Internet in which he calls upon everyone to overwhelm RG members with love. A list of 
around 1.000 Twitter accounts was published, who had joined RG campaigns with at 
least two tweets or are in a Twitter network with at least ten right-wing users. While
Bohmermann’s satirical project was intended to be just that, it accidentally morphed 
into a civic movement. The RI server has 62.000 members and even public figures and 
politicians have referred to #ReconquistaInternet to express their support. On the server, 
both online and offline events are discussed. For example, the words “hang on friendly 
Dresden, you are not alone! #ReconquistaInternet” (Wichmann, 2018) were projected 
onto Dresden’s Frauenkirche. Dresden is known country-wide for its right-wing 
populism and regular demonstrations on Monday by AfD supporters. (Wichmann, 2018) 
Reconquista Discord of course only tweets satirical content about RI and questions the 
project and its goals.
RG retweeted ludwigtagel, who posted pictures of flyers and stickers showing Pepe the 
frog, a popular far-right meme, bearing RG logos, to be handed out at Leipzig’s annual 
book fair -  which had 271.000 visitors. A far-right publisher’s picture (verlag_antonios) 
from its stand at the fair with a lot of interested people was also retweeted. 
Darksideofkek is an account that tweets around five times per day and has almost 1.500 
followers. The user mostly posts satirical content and Reconquista Discord retweeted 
content regarding Reconquista Internet. In fact, Reconquista Discord appears to be 
engaged in a heavy counter-campaign against RI. The movement also appears to be well 
connected to the Identitarians; one tweet shares a link to a live stream from a right-wing 
demonstration in Bottrop, which also einprozent.de has shared. Thus, the members seem 
to overlap.
Altrightleak is a user who appears to be a member of the RG discord server and leaks its 
content. The account has 4.320 followers and the tweets contain screenshots from 
discussions on the RG server. Most recently the RG community tried to find out 
Bohmermann’s residential address to harass him at home. Photos from him outside his 
house were compared to satellite pictures, and users tried to find useful information on 
his social media profiles and suggested following him around until he returns home. A 
part of this conversation can be seen in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Screenshot of discussion on RG's server (alrightleak, 30.06.2018)
Such content is systematically ridiculed by RG's Twitter account and called lies and 
fake news. Generally, criticism directed at RG or the right-wing movement, in general, 
is ridiculed and rejected as insubstantial. Also, complex issues are oversimplified, like 
for example a retweet of Poggenburg that contains the cartoon depicted in Figure 9. The 
left section takes place in Germany and shows women demonstrating Islamization. A 
journalist calls them right-wing radicals. The right section depicts women 
demonstrating for their rights in Iran -  and the same journalist calls them brave 
feminists.
Figure 9: cartoon retweeted by RD (poggenburgandre, 10.02.2018)
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The cartoon's message is that both groups protest Islam, whereby it is acceptable if 
Muslim women do it, and unacceptable from German women. Of course, reality is more 
complex and the women in Iran did not protest Islam, but a government that curtails 
their personal rights.
Reconquista Germanica's Twitter profile and news reports about its Discord server 
demonstrate that it is a right-wing organization that appears to connect a large number 
of people of the right-wing spectrum in closed discussion groups. Judging from the 
successful campaigns during the German federal elections, the organization of online 
events is successful. Eber's report suggests that on the server, an alternative reality is 
constructed, that ultimately shall be translated into the real world too and the 
organization's members are organized in a military manner with structures that allow 
for promotion and advancement in the ranks. The screenshots taken by altrightleak also 
suggest that members may even be willing to use violence against ideological 
opponents. The intense reactions to Reconquista Internet reveal the extent to which the 
right-wing ideology has solidified among members. As explained in sub-chapter 3.1, the 
retreat into private discussions can further radicalize individuals, as it solidifies and 
affirms existing beliefs.
Returning to the sub-question, “How does the German right-wing operate on Twitter?”, 
this sub-chapter has shown that while the actors vary in their use of Twitter, they all 
share certain strategies: all groups, parties, and organizations portray an alternative 
reality in which the government, the media and sometimes even economic giants at best 
have lost focus on the truly important matters and at worst have conspired to instigate 
dangerous processes like immigration, that will cause the downfall of German society. 
Especially the German government under Merkel is considered representative for all the 
ills that have befallen the country. Current political issues and studies are 
misrepresented and lack comprehensive contexts. They are used to confirm right-wing 
opinions and legitimize whichever course of action each organization suggests. On their 
Twitter profiles, the accounts analyzed provide simple solutions to complex issues, 
which appeal to their followers and potential new supporters, as they convey the 
message that the group in question is the only one in possession of the true facts and the 
right answers.
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Many of the groups analyzed here are political parties, and also RG seeks to increase
support for the AfD -  thus the general trend, as Koehler predicts -  is to take over 
Germany legally by elections. In line with his argumentation, foreigners and the left­
wing are considered enemies, whereby the accounts analyzed label any opposition 
leftist. Competing opinions generally are decried as leftist and unfounded, misguided or 
ill-natured. While the IB is very good at using Twitter to connect infrastructure and 
ideology, others like Die Rechte or NPD do not seem to exhaust the potential that 
Twitter offers. However, as is the case for the NPD, they likely rely on other structures 
and possibly more private forms of communication. Whereas more private chat rooms 
can facilitate further radicalization, they rarely risk drawing newcomers in. Despite 
these differences in the use of Twitter, they all address similar issues like strong 
disapproval of Merkel, hostility towards asylum seekers, Islam, and immigrant 
criminality. The respective hashtags for themes that many accounts use are 
#Merkelmussweg (MerkelHasToGo), #remigration, #NoIslam, #ReconquistaGermanica 
and #Kandelistuberall (Kandeliseverywhere) as well as #QFD. While this sub-chapter 
has already provided insight into how the contrast society is portrayed on Twitter, the 
following hashtag analysis will provide more detailed insights.
4.4 Right-wing Twitter networks as a contrast society
In the next paragraphs, the following hashtags will be analyzed using NodeXl, Gephi 
and Keyhole data analysis: #QFD, #MerkelMussWeg, #NoIslam, #remigration, 
#ReconquistaGermanica and #Kandelistueberall.
#QDF
Figure 10 shows a visualization of the #QFD network. To learn more about the 
dynamics of this hashtag that is popular among the German right-wing, the components 
of the network are analyzed in this section.
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Figure 10: #QFD on Twitter
The central node in the purple cluster is netzdenunziant. In his tweet, he replies to 
another user, who tested a theory he developed about reversing the shadowban, as the 
scene calls the filtering of certain contents. Somebody developed a tool where users can 
check if they are indeed shadow-banned. Netzdenunziant believes that the ban will be 
reversed it one gains a significant number of new followers, who are not associated with 
ones' network, which is shadow-banned. Because many right-wing Twitter users are 
connected, it is easier for Twitter to identify accounts and apply its quality filters to 
them. Thus, on the one hand, large networks of like-minded people may be useful for 
networking, on the other hand, it sabotages visibility for some right-wing networks. In 
the post that netzdenunziant comments on, a user verifies his theory by getting a large 
group of Arab bots to follow her account, which diversified her followers enough to lift 
the shadow-ban. Netzdenunziant is also on Gab. One of his posts there concerns a 
campaign called ShadowbanTwitter. #ShadowbanTwitter in Gab produced a large 
discussion on a campaign for the entire far-right scene to shun Twitter for a few days in 
May 2018. The campaign seems to originate in the United States, where 
usworkers4trump initiated it to protest Twitter's so-called censoring. The possibly 
original post is displayed in Figure 11.
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US Workers For Trump :3>USWorkers4Trump May 25 v
SConservatlve InfluencersB Please help promote trShadowBanTwitter I It 
Impacts us all! mike_Zollo MlkeCernovIch RealErlnCruz charllekirkl 1 
PresidentITrump realmattcouch The_Trump_Traln 1776Stonewall JackPosoblec 
education4libs WayneDupreeShow RealEagleWIngs
J Z1J L L l '2  .  *7 J I< mnrcK! <
# S h a d o w B a n T w itte r
Twitter has silenced PATRIOTS for too long! On 
Memorial Day Weekend, 2018 conservatives 
across the country wilt go INACTIVE for 48 hours to
protests Twitter "SHADOW BANS". By TAKING A
STAND, we say to Twitter: You censor our speech, 
we censor your money! No ad revenue. No 
clicks. No traffic.
Honor our fallen SOLDIERS by fighting for the 
rights they died to protect!
For information and updates follow:
@usworkers4trump
Figure 11: Shadow ban campaign on Twitter (usworkers4trump, 23.05.2018)
With over 9.000 followers usworkers4trump is likely to have attracted the attention of 
the German right-wing, especially because the account posts ideologically affiliated 
content. The other clusters in the network are also right-wing accounts and similarly 
concerned with Twitter's quality filters. Only the unconnected orange cluster in the 
bottom right corner is an article about Twitter's filters by a news website.
#QFD reached 4.342.753 people on Twitter, originating from 648 users. However, only 
5.794 users engaged with the hashtag. A lot the of associated hashtags are English, as 
can be seen in Figure 12.
j o i ic ju u v v u d i ii ic u  qfdshadowbanning
ihadowbanned.3=shadowbanning
twitter shadowban • ■
T maga qfdshadowban
Figure 12: hashtags frequently used together with #QFD (Keyhole, #QFD)
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In fact, whereas 8.53 percent of the hashtag originates in Germany, it is mostly used in 
the United States with 82.12 percent. Thus, the red crosses together with #QFD appears 
to be a trend in the German right-wing scene that renders right-wing Twitter accounts 
easily identifiable.
#MerkelMussWeg
The hashtag #MerkelMussWeg is popular among the right-wing online. The core of the 
network is visualized in Figure 13. The network has a modularity measure of 0.657, 
meaning there are groups of users that talk to each other, and but not exclusively. At the 
center of the large purple cluster is djjem. This user shared a video and in the tweet 
called Merkel a terrorist (djjem, 24.07.2018), that has received 73 reactions. The green 
cluster is paprika_im_blut's tweet of a picture of his car in the United States that sports 
a “Merkel Muss Weg” bumper sticker (paprika_im_blut, 02.09.2017). The comments 
reveal that other users feel assured in their own political opinion: support from such a 
distance strengthens their own beliefs and if even Germans abroad care, they have to be 
right.
Figure 13: Network #MerkelMussWeg
The tweet in the center of the blue cluster shares a news link about an alleged bomb 
builder, whose wife allegedly wanted to test ricin on a hamster. The user, 66freedom66, 
used this headline to comment that there are too many ‘sick' people in this world and 
put Merkel in the hashtags (66freedom66, 24.07.2018). This is an excellent example of 
how non-political news are instrumentalized to criticize the current political system.
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This piece of news had nothing to do with Germany's immigration policy, yet the way it 
was tweeted implies this would not have happened, had a different government been in 
power.
The green cluster to the left is similar: it is also a tweet that uses political news to 
validate the user's personal opinions. This tweet concerns Trump's and Putin's meeting 
and the user comments that talking to each other is better than warmongering, like 
Obama, Clinton and Merkel do (apfelrepublik, 25.07.2018) While communication 
between heads of governments is certainly necessary, apfelrepublik leaves out the wider 
context of the controversy this last meeting between the two presidents caused within 
the United States and for its allies (Morrin, 2018).
The pink and orange clusters contain similar content.
#MerkelMussWeg has reached 433.774 people in 320 posts. This reach is outstanding. 
Also, hashtags frequently used are associated with the right-wing scene and can be seen 
in Figure 14.
Figure 14: hashtags frequently used together with #MerkelMussWeg (Keyhole, #MerkelMussWeg)
Also, the most influential users regarding this tweet are AfD members. This may 
explain the large reach of the hashtag, given AfD's vast amount of followers. However,
the fact that a political party -  and not an underground movement -  propagates such a 
system-critical hashtag is worrying.
#remigration
For #remigration, the Yifan Hu layout algorithm was chosen to create a better overview 
of the network in Figure 15: #remigration. Because the imported data from Twitter 
contained tweets in different languages, the data was adjusted to contain only German
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language tweets. The network has a high modularity measure of 0.783 with a few large
communities in the center. The large purple group is clustered around multiple tweets
by karinazurich. On her account, she frequently uses hashtags like #gruneversenken 
(sink the Greens) and #linkeversenken (sink the Left). In one of her tweets in the purple 
cluster, she quotes a news headline that states the Turkish community wants the entire 
management of the German football federation to resign. These demands are based on 
the German national player Ozil, who resigned from the team because he felt 
discriminated against. Karinazurich comments that she wants everyone who has 
constant demands to move to a country where they do not have to make demand all the 
time -  implying that the Turkish community should leave (karinazurich, 23.07.2018). 
The reactions in the comments are supportive and many try to relativize the racism 
accusations regarding Ozil’s departure from the national team. In fact, some even 
consider this issue an instigated opportunity for a left-wing campaign. This again 
demonstrates a blurred perception of reality.
Figure 15: #remigration
The green cluster is a survey-style tweet in which kardasiapat asks whether the 
construction of mosques should be completely illegal, using #Ozil #AfD #Islamisierung 
(Islamization) #Remigration #NoAsyl #FestungEurope (FortressEurope)
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#EuropaGegenIslam (EuropeAgainstIslam) #Islamverbot (#BanIslam) (kardasiapat, 
23.07.2018). At the time of writing, 791 users have voted, 92 percent voted in favor of a 
ban on the construction of mosques. In the replies, many express their wish to take it 
further and ban Islam altogether. At best, users comment that Islam does not belong to 
Germany, at worst they call it not a religion, but a totalitarian ideology and mosques are 
considered military barracks. This tweet expresses the deep-seated Islamophobia that 
many in the right-wing scene share.
In the blue cluster, users are gathered around a tweet by ahoihanseat, who cites a 2010 
Merkel quote in which she stated that ‘multiculti' has failed (ahoihanseat, 24.07.2018). 
While this may have held true in 2010 and in whichever context the German chancellor 
has said this, the situation in 2018 is very different and by no means comparable. Citing 
public authorities out of context and using the message as a justification for their own 
political philosophies appears to be a popular choice and represents not only a lack of 
personal reflection but also the alternate reality which is constructed online.
A regional AfD account, AfD Ilmkreis Gotha (afd_ok_gth) is the central node in the 
orange cluster. The AfD group tweeted a picture from a topic that was discussed in the 
Thuringian regional parliament. While afd_ok_gth refers to an attempted gang rape by a 
group of underage refugees, the document states: “the group of youths followed the 
woman and circled her. Then one grabbed her wrist and prompted her to come with 
them. The woman kicked the man, who loosened his grip and she ran away.” 
(afd_ok_gth, 18.07.2018). While this situation was certainly unpleasant for the affected 
woman it does not warrant the label ‘attempted rape'. Nonetheless -  and despite the fact 
that the situation is clearly described in the attached picture -  afd_ok_gth calls it that, 
seeking to stir up hatred.
Lastly, the black group is clustered around im_tod. This account tweets content that 
uses irony to criticize German politics and justifies her political views by denunciating 
whoever competes with her beliefs. One of the tweets that are represented in the
network reads: “January 2015 until June 2018: 86.977 Afghan applications for asylum 
were denied, deported were: 347 Source: Welt (BAMF statistic).” (der_tod, 
20.07.2018). She does use real data, which appears to be deliberately included in the 
tweet, however the information is presented without context in order to serve her 
purpose. In fact, many denied asylum applications get revised for different reasons. In
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addition, German immigration authorities are overwhelmed and processing times take 
very long.
#remigration has reached 409.767 users in the past month; thereby 393 users have used 
the hashtag and 910 have interacted with it. However, because it is an English language 
word, its use is not restricted to German-speaking countries alone. A closer assessment 
reveals more: the hashtags associated with it are mostly German, as can be seen in 
Figure 16.
Figure 16: hashtags frequently used together with #remigration (Keyhole, #remigration)
Thus, while #remigration is not German, a lot of the tweets appear to be German. The 
two most influential users according to keyhole are Romain Espiro, a member of the 
Identitarian Movement in France and karinazurich.
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#NoIslam
For #NoIslam again all non-German tweets were removed from the dataset. The 
network has a modularity of 0.632 and is visualized in Figure 17.
Figure 17: #NoIslam
The large purple cluster is grouped around André Poggenburg's tweet: “Slowly
something is happening! “Islam does not belong to Germany ” -  because it is a religion 
that opposes our values and constitution. We do not want to have any Islamic cultural
landmarks and symbols of power here. #AfDwirkt #NoIslam” (poggenburgandre, 
23.07.2018). Attached to the tweet is an article by COMPACT magazine about a 
plebiscite against the construction of a mosque in Kaufbeuren. The article is written an 
in inflammatory tone and calls demonstrators against the referendum's result left-wing- 
plastered and was shared 1.600 times (Elsässer, 2018). Poggenburg's tweet received 325 
retweets, 932 likes and was replied 98 times. Many of the replies support Poggenburg, 
while only some remain critical. Thereby, for them, Merkel's government is emblematic 
for everything that is wrong in society and everyone who disagrees is automatically 
branded a misguided do-gooder or fascist. Islam is generally portrayed as intolerant;
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some call it an ideology and bossert_heinz even tweets that there is no need for new 
mosques since there are enough pigsties (bossert_heinz, 23.07.2018)
Several tweets by Ahoihanseat are at the center of the blue cluster. Most of them 
express his support for the referendum in Kaufbeuren. All his tweets are replies to 
others and without much interaction themselves. Because this user has come up two 
times in the hashtag analysis, a closer look at his profile may be more telling. His tweets 
portray the German political system as pretense-democracy, whereby the political 
establishment does not listen to the people and governs how they think it is right. The 
fact that the referendum has received a lot of disapproval is explained by Germany's ill- 
functioning democracy that does not respect the opinion of the people. The perils and 
merits of referendums is a broad topic itself. However, the discourse here demonstrates 
a deep suspicion of the German government and the democratic system. In fact, a core 
demand of the NPD and AfD are more referendums, because they take away power 
from ‘corrupt' politicians and bring it back to the people. The events in Kaufbeuren 
certainly add fuel to this debate. The public disapproval is explained by the failure of 
the system and the inability of others to recognize the real dangers.
The pink cluster is centered around pinkcrazypony's tweet about the increased number 
of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Germany. Referring to the referendum in 
Kaufbeuren, which brought tears to the eyes of the local city councilor, he asks her: 
“[...] Where are the councilors tears now?[...] Oh..I forgot she is pro Islam [...]”
(pinkcrazypony, 24.07.2018) Attached to this tweet are hashtags like #NoIslam, but also 
#NeinzurKinderehe (NotoChildMarriage). Pinkcrazypony cites a newly published study 
by Terre des Femmes. A closer look at the study shows, however, that this increase is 
based on an increase in women and girls from Eritrea, Somalia, and Iraq, who come to 
Germany. They either are already victims of FGM upon arrival, or the procedure is 
performed during visits back home -  to date, there are no known cases of the procedure 
taking place in Germany (58.000 Frauen in Deutschland, 2018). These facts, however, 
are neither included in pinkcrazypony's tweet, nor in the news link attached to it. This 
way, the numbers can convey the message that FGM is being performed in Germany -  
which can stir up hatred and certainly serves as justification for users which radical 
political opinions. Although child marriage has nothing to do with the content of his 
tweet, the user added #NeinzurKinderehe. Occupation of topics like child protection is a 
strategy of the right-wing to lure others into their spheres. This tweet demonstrates how
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parts of a truth are used to justify existing beliefs, stir up hatred and at the same time 
create a reputable impression through the reference to news pages.
The black cluster refers to several tweets that reply to or mention the main AfD account 
in their tweets. Because in this case there are a variety of different tweets, it will be too
much to analyze them all -  especially because AfD is analyzed in great detail above. 
The hashtags in all the tweets, however, reveal the general sentiment as in all other 
tweets analyzed here: a deep suspicion towards the government (hashtags against 
Merkel as well as the popular parties) and hostility towards Islam (#noasyl, #nosharia, 
#remigration, #stoppmoscheebau (stop building mosques)).
The small light green cluster is clustered around karinazurich. She shared a link about 
threats made by Islamists to the British right-wing activist Tommy Robinson, who 
currently is in prison, and his wife (karinazurich, 21.07.2018). This tweet has not had 
much interaction. One user replied with a picture that shows Robinson, together with 
the demand to set him free, calling him a political prisoner (palindrome_666, 
21.07.2018). Robinson is a journalist and became an icon of the right-wing scene after 
he was sentenced to 13 months in prison. The right-wing claims that his sentence is 
unjust and accuses the British government of just getting rid of an unpleasant critic. 
They claim he just made video recordings in front of the court, upon which he was 
detained and imprisoned because he disturbed the public peace. In fact, however, 
Robinson videotaped a process in court -  which is not allowed -  and received a 
suspended sentence of three months, together with a warning that he will face trial if he 
unduly publishes process details again. Thus, he knew the outcome when he live- 
streamed the process, which included the names of underage accused -  a matter in 
which the rules are specifically strict. His sentence was therefore not unjustified, but an 
assertion of the rule of law. (Konietzny, 2018) This again demonstrates how the right­
wing interpretation of public events lacks full detail. The imprisonment of Tommy 
Robinson is instrumentalized to rally support along the entire right-wing spectrum 
internationally. This, on the one hand, spreads the message of an arbitrary and 
oppressive government and on the other, provides the right-wing with an issue to unite 
for and establish a feeling of cohesion and mass.
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Figure 18: hashtags frequently used together with #NoIslam (Keyhole, #NoIslam)
#NoIslam reached 527.006 users on Twitter in 571 tweets by 427 users. This too is a 
vast reach that originates from a few accounts. However, there were only 571
intentional interactions. The most influential user of #NoIslam is André Poggenburg
followed by corruptologo -  who tweets in English and Spanish, and katrinazurich. Also, 





Figure 19 shows #ReconquistaGermanica. The network has a modularity measure of 
0.541. The largest node is dirmunsul. His Twitter profile identifies him as a member of 
the far-right. He has 277 followers and shared an RG video that has received a number 
of reactions. The other nodes in the purple network are mentioned or tweeted to 
dirmunsul's tweet. He has also to André Poggenburg, as well as another large node in 
the blue cluster, rmichael2000, who appears to be members of the far-right scene too, 
though not very influential. Robert30521605 is an account in the green cluster he has 
mentioned. While this account only has 160, he has received almost 1500 likes and 
tweets a lot of his own content. Robert30521605 uses #ReconquistaGermanica a lot in 
his tweets and appears to be very involved in the network. Other nodes in the green 
cluster are Twitter accounts of the Left Party and various far-right private accounts, 
none of them with a considerable number of followers or likes.
In the blue cluster is André Poggenburg as well as Austria's vice chancellor Hans 
Christian Strache, who belongs to the populist Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
(Freedom Party Austria). The most active account in this cluster is @seppdahte. He only 
joined in January 2018 and has almost 2500 tweets and almost as many likes. He 
retweets RG content and also appeared in the #NPD cluster. Twitonomy analysis data 
shows that #ReconquistaGermanica is if fact this user's most used hashtag. 
Heiligerevolte (holy insurrection) is the center of the dark grey cluster. With almost 900
followers and 7.600 likes, the account has a comparably large outreach.
While #ReconquistaGermanica is used by both sides of the political spectrum -  largely 
due to the RI campaign, the hashtags most associated with it place it in the context of 
the right-wing scene, as can be seen in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: hashtags frequently used together with #ReconquistaGermanica (Keyhole #Reconquista 
Germanica)
Overall, the enormous public attention that RG has drawn creates the perception of a 
large and very influential movement. In addition, all criticism is ridiculed and refuted by 
members of the movement. Criticism may unite members even further against 
competing opinions. In private discussion on the Discord server members support each
others' opinions which can reinforce and amplify radical beliefs -  as altrightleak's
screenshots have shown. It is therefore conceivable that the overall situation gives 
members the feeling the movement has reached a critical mass, which may radicalize 
some further and also serves as a justification for more offline action.
#Kandelistueberall
#Kandelistueberall (Kandel is everywhere) originated with the murder of the 15-year- 
old Mia in Kandel, Germany by her ex-boyfriend, who is an Afghan refugee, in 
December 2017. Since then, Kandel has become the stage for right-wing movements to 
protest the government's immigration policy. In addition, “Kandel ist überall” 
demonstrations have taken place throughout Germany (Wenz, 2018).
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Figure 21: #Kandelistueberall
The network in Figure 21: #Kandelistueberall has a modularity measure of 0.351. This 
means, that there are many connections between the different clusters. This is the lowest 
measure of any of the networks analyzed thus far. At the center of the large purple 
cluster are several tweets by the Kandel movement's Twitter account, kandelueberall. 
Because there are many tweets in this cluster, only the ones with most interaction are 
analyzed here. One of them is an invitation to follow the movement on the App 
Telegram, to get updates about the movement, or on Facebook, but the tweet notes that 
the latter may be more difficult because the pages' administrators appear to get blocked 
regularly. There are only 206 subscribers to the Telegram group, whereas the Twitter 
account has 1.449 followers, but a shift to more constraint-free media has also been 
observed elsewhere in this research. Another tweet contains a similar message: one of 
the movement's founders introduces herself and invites followers to join her on the 
movement's official Telegram channel, in addition to inviting everyone to join a large 
right-wing demonstration in the city of Mainz (kandelueberall, 19.07.2018). The 
reactions to this tweet are mostly negative: while one user shares his frustration that 
kandelueberall is shadow-banned, all other replies mock the movement. One last 
popular tweet concerns the search for an Afghan youth who allegedly tried to kill
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someone. While in the tweet it is stated the police seeks him because he killed someone,
he in fact ‘only’ tried to do so -  an issue that the only reply to this tweet also points out. 
(kandelistueberall, 19.07.2018) The tweet received 64 retweets and 46 likes. While 
kandelueberall is the largest cluster in the network, it does not provide much 
information about the right-wing’s contrast society.
The green group is clustered around a tweet by official_pegida, the official account of 
the Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West). This 
tweet contains just hashtags (#MerkelMussWeg, #Trump, and #Bannon) and has several 
pictures attached to it that contain information on upcoming Pegida demonstrations.
The central tweet in the orange cluster by hugenotte3 is no longer available in Germany. 
Accessing the page with a foreign VPN shows the tweet: “And again an Afghan, 20
years young. With a knife on his way to an honor killing. This vermin need to leave our 
country. I'm done with stories like this. #Kandelistueberall #AfDwirkt #faz #sz #welt 
#bild” (Hugenotte3, 20.07.2018). This tweet refers to kandelueberall’s tweet about the 
attempted murder by an Afghan youth. It received eight likes and three retweets. This 
tweet expresses a lot of hatred towards immigrants. Anger about an attempted murder is 
justified, however, gross generalizations are not. Tweets like this show how easily 
individuals draw conclusions from single acts and condemn an entire community 
because of it.
The light blue cluster on the right is assembled around a tweet realjohr, who retweeted 
AfD speaker Malte Kaufmann. In the latter’s original tweet he complained that 
ecclesiastic groups and trade unions have incited the people against the right, and shame 
everyone who does not support ‘multiculti’ as fear mongers. Realjohr criticizes this and 
tweets that AfD and criminals have incited the people and everything constitutional is 
condemned as filthy-left-wing (realjohr, 22.07.2018). Because this tweet is critical of 
the Kandel movement the blue cluster is also not connected to the others. The same 
holds true for the other clusters along the fringes.
Lastly, the black cluster in the top is a tweet with a Young Freedom cartoon. It shows 
two groups of demonstrators: on the right side are AfD supporters who mourn the killed 
girls, on the other is the press, the Green party and left-wing activists who blame the 
Minister of Interior, Horst Seehofer, for the drowned refugees and point accusingly at 
the other group (nunu_balloon, 19.07.2018) This again is a good example of the over­
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simplification of facts: refugee crimes are isolated cases and the dire situation of the 
refugees at sea has nothing to do with the tragic murder of German women.
Although #Kandelistueberall appears to be not as prominent as other hashtags analyzed, 
it has reached 100.000 users, whereby only 266 users have tweeted about it. Of those 
100.000 however, only 459 have engaged with #Kandelistueberall. The most influential 
account is, as the social network graphic also shows, kandelueberall.
The hashtag analysis of re-occurring hashtags used by the accounts analyzed previously 
has solidified sub-chapter 4.3's impression of the right-wing as a contrast society. For 
most hashtags analyzed the modularity measure is very high, signaling that while there 
are many connections between the users in clusters, they do not connect much to other 
clusters. This is also visualized in the graphics created on Gephi. This can be counted 
towards evidence for a filter bubble, in which the German right-wing is conversing. A 
definite conclusion on whether there is, in fact, a filter bubble or not requires a much 
more detailed analysis of Twitter networks. However, given that social media like 
Twitter is programmed in a way that users see content that affirms their opinions, it is 
not far-fetched to assume that there is indeed a filter bubble. Given the fact that a very 
different picture of Germany's current political and domestic situation is created on 
Twitter, coupled with the host of users who spread and add to propagandistic contents 
and the likely existence of a right-wing filter bubble, a right-wing contrast society has 
clearly been established on Twitter networks.
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5. Conclusion
This research has sought to explore how the German right-wing as a contrast society is 
portrayed on Twitter networks. Therefore, a detailed overview of the relevant right­
wing actors and their ideology was given, so as to identify whose Twitter accounts to 
include in the social network analysis in chapter 4.3 and to identify radicalizing themes 
for the subsequent hashtag analysis in chapter 4.4. Influential actors in the German 
right-wing scene are parties like the Alternative for Germany, NPD, and Die Rechte, in 
addition to movements such as the Identitarians and Reconquista Germanica. These five 
were analyzed to establish how they operate on Twitter. In addition, this way, 
radicalizing themes in the form of hashtags were identified and analyzed to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of how the right-wing as a contrast society is portrayed on 
Twitter networks. The analyzed hashtags are #QFD, #MerkelMussWeg, #NoIslam, 
#remigration, #ReconquistaGermanica and #Kandelistueberall. They all reflect strong 
disapproval of Merkel, hostility towards asylum seekers, Islam, immigrant criminality 
and accusations of censorship. Taken together, these two analyses have revealed that a 
very different picture of Germany's current political and domestic situation is created on 
Twitter. While the organizations and parties differ in their use of Twitter -  and not all 
exhaust its full potential -  they all share certain strategies: all groups, parties, and 
organizations portray an alternative reality in which the government, the media and 
sometimes even economic giants at best have lost focus on the truly important matters 
and at worst have conspired to instigate dangerous processes that will cause the 
downfall of German society. Especially the German government under Merkel is 
considered representative for all the ills that have befallen the country. Current political 
issues and studies are misrepresented and lack comprehensive context. They are used to 
confirm right-wing opinions and legitimize whichever course of action each 
organization suggests. On their Twitter profiles, the accounts analyzed provide simple 
solutions to complex issues, which appeal to their followers and potential new 
supporters, as they convey the message that the group in question is the only one in 
possession of the true facts and the right answers.
Koehler's suggestion that the German right-wing seeks to take over Germany legally by 
elections was also confirmed: while for the parties, electoral victories are an obvious 
goal, also Reconquista Germanica and the Identitarians seek to mobilize support for 
right-wing parties.
74
Across all accounts analyzed -  be they official party accounts or followers -  a fierce 
opposition to any competing beliefs was recorded. Even if facts are clearly provided, 
there is a general refusal to acknowledge them. In addition, current political news, 
scientific findings, and statistics are quoted selectively: this way reputable sources are 
quoted which renders the message more convincing and provides ‘facts' that confirm 
the right-wing's worldview. Challenges to this worldview are not acknowledged and 
most of the time met with outright hostility. In fact, competing opinions of individuals, 
parties, groups, and organizations are discarded as unfounded, misguided, threatening 
and even criminal -  a plurality of thought is clearly rejected.
Especially the younger AfD and Identitarian Movement use Twitter much more 
effectively. The various AfD's accounts speak to a large spectrum of voters and each 
age group and political ideology from conservative to right-wing appears to be 
addressed by the different official accounts. Coupled with large follower numbers and 
the plethora of affiliated accounts, AfD has a huge reach on Twitter. The Identitarian 
Movement very successfully engages youths with a large range of contents that appeal 
to younger individuals and creates the impression that every single person is important 
for the greater movement. The IB is specifically successful in synergizing online and 
offline activities, by mixing politics with spare time activities. Especially large and 
visible campaigns like the vessels in front of the African coasts and the pending release 
of its app, that will further blur the line between online and offline activism, 
demonstrate its effectiveness.
The hashtag analyses' results indicate at the possible existence of a right-wing filter 
bubble. The modularity rate for all analyzed hashtags was high. This means that while 
there are many connections between the users in clusters, they do not connect much to 
other clusters. A definite conclusion on whether there is, in fact, a filter bubble or not 
requires a much more detailed analysis of Twitter networks, as well as networks on 
other social media. Due to the limitations of this format, this research only focused on 
Twitter. A detailed analysis of for example Facebook and YouTube channels will add to 
the results significantly. Also, future research should deepen the Twitter analysis to 
confirm the right-wing filter bubble.
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Nonetheless, given that social media like Twitter is programmed in a way that users see 
content that affirms their opinions, it is not far-fetched to assume that there is indeed a 
right-wing filter bubble.
Based on the fact that a very different picture of Germany's current political and 
domestic situation is portrayed on Twitter, coupled with the likely existence of a right­
wing filter bubble, a right-wing contrast society has clearly been established on Twitter 
networks. The reality portrayed online is threatening: the government sanctions mass
immigration to Germany -  at best due to ignorance, at worst intentional, to serve a 
greater purpose that will cause the downfall of German society. Thereby the media has 
conspired with the government, sometimes large corporations and the left-wing against 
the good of the German people. The right-wing online community is portrayed as the 
resistance to the evil forces in power and right-wing parties are the only ones who see 
the situation for what it is and offer the only plausible solution to return Germany into a 
more desirable state. This coincides with Koehler's definition of the contrast society's 
goal: because the right-wing cannot live out its ideology in mainstream society, it seeks 
out niches where it establishes a contrast society that is maintained and nurtured until 
the misled population has been brought back on the right path and Germany can be 
remodeled into the ideological ideal. A more extreme implementation of this can be 
seen on the Reconquista Germanica, as well as the Ritterkreuzorden server, where 
efforts are being made to structure online communications as close as possible 
according to an ideal, military-style society.
In the broader societal context, the blatant disregard of obvious facts and figures is 
worrying. If the right-wing is indeed as unreasonable and easy to convince with populist 
appeals, the moderate parties face a great challenge in gaining back the voters it has lost 
to the right. The Identitarian Movement's international success, its right-wing lobby 
group EinProzent and Bannon's political foundation all imply that the right-wing will 
expand its international networks, coordinate its future campaigns a lot better and gain 
more supporters. In fact, with more international ties, potential ideological and 
monetary support and increased professionalism, the European right-wing will become 
more socially acceptable in the years to come. Subsequently, right-wing demands for a 
halt on immigration, a greater emphasis on sovereign principles and a reversal of the
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European integration process will be hard to ignore. Ultimately these trends may 
jeopardize the European project that has kept the continent at peace for the last decades. 
To counter these trends and curb online hate speech and incitement, a new strategy 
against the right-wing's only activities needs to be devised. In addition, politics need to 
address issues that the right-wing so easily instrumentalizes to gain supporters, like for 
example the stark demographic change in Eastern Germany as well as improving 
employment perspectives for youths and invest more in infrastructures that allow for 
affordable housing and makes family planning and a career more agreeable with each 
other.
Finding an appropriate balance between free speech and the censorship of illegal
contents is an exceedingly difficult task -  yet one that needs to be tackled. Many 
attempts to control hate speech and provide alternative counter-narratives feed into the 
right-wing's propaganda and are used to further the radical agenda. It is therefore 
important that such campaigns are carefully considered before their execution. 
Ultimately an inclusive narrative needs to be established that addresses liberal as well as 
conservative concerns in a respectful and cooperative manner. Countering the right­
wing narrative can be a daunting task, but it is every society's responsibility to do its 
utmost best to create a better future for the generations to come.
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